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Abstract 
This dissertation consists of two essays studying cost management within firms. 
The first essay examines the impact of declining firm performance on managers’ 
investment decisions. Investment decisions have significant implications for firm 
operating risk in that they represent expenditures of firm capital with uncertain future 
benefits. Behavioral theories predict that managers are likely to exhibit shifts in their risk 
preferences in response to declining performance. Analyzing cost data from a cross-
sectional sample of firms from the years 1992 through 2014, I find that managers shift 
investments away from less risky capital expenditures toward more risky R&D 
expenditures following periods of declining performance. I also examine and find 
moderating effects of firm losses, corporate governance, and financial incentives on the 
relationship between declining performance and firm investment behavior. These results 
suggest that managers take on additional operating risk through their investment 
decisions following periods of declining performance.   
 The second essay, with Hsihui Chang and Curtis Hall, examines the effects of 
customer concentration levels on firm cost structure decisions. Analyzing cost data from 
a sample of manufacturing firms from 1976 through 2013, we find a negative relationship 
between customer concentration and cost elasticity whereby firms exhibit lower 
proportions of variable-to-fixed costs in the presence of higher levels of customer 
concentration. Additionally, we find that greater customer bargaining power, proxied by 
supplier industry competition and product market fluidity, leads to lower cost elasticity as 
customer concentration becomes greater. These results are robust to alternate 
specifications as well as controlling for endogeneity using a two-stage model. Our results 
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suggest that suppliers respond to customer concentration by pursuing increased mutual 
dependence and cooperation with customers rather than attempting to reduce the effect of 
power imbalances within the supplier-customer relationship. 
This dissertation is accompanied by an extensive, multidisciplinary review of the 
literature related to managerial risk-taking, an important determinant of managers’ cost 
management decisions which underlies both of these studies. 
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Chapter 1 
Literature Review: Determinants of Managerial Risk-Taking 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 Risk-taking is a topic of widespread interest across a variety of disciplines. As this 
dissertation is concerned with risk-taking in the form of managers’ investment and cost 
structure decisions, I begin with a multidisciplinary review of the literature related to 
risk-taking which will help inform the models used elsewhere in this dissertation. Figure 
1.1 provides an overview of the broad categories into which prior literature on risk-taking 
are grouped for the purposes of this literature review.  
<Insert Figure 1.1 About Here> 
1.2 Compensation and Incentives 
 The use of managerial compensation as a mechanism for aligning the risk 
preferences of managers with those of shareholders provides the foundation for an 
extensive body of literature in accounting, economics, and finance. Shareholders are 
traditionally assumed to be risk-neutral with respect to a firm’s investment decisions 
because shareholders are able to invest their personal wealth among a diversified 
portfolio of companies (Holmstrom 1979). The majority of a manager’s personal wealth, 
by contrast, is tied up in the firm where they are employed. The inability of managers to 
effectively diversify investment of their personal wealth, therefore, leads to a general 
assumption of risk-aversion among managers (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama 1980). 
Agency costs arise from this incentive misalignment in the form of returns lost due to 
managerial risk aversion (Hall and Murphy 2002). Shareholders offer compensation 
contracts which tie managerial compensation to firm performance as a way to better align 
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the risk preferences of managers with their own risk preferences, incentivizing higher 
levels of risk-taking (Devers, Cannella, Reilly, & Yoder 2007). While Holmstrom (1979) 
concludes that no compensation system can perfectly align the risk preferences of 
managers and shareholders, an extensive body of literature has documented the 
effectiveness of both compensation and financial incentives at improving risk-preference 
alignment by influencing managerial risk-taking behavior. 
<Table 1.1 About Here> 
Performance-based compensation incentives have been proposed and extensively 
studied as a relatively simple method for better aligning the risk preferences of managers 
and shareholders. Prior literature has examined the relationship between various incentive 
characteristics and managerial risk-taking behavior. Wright, Kroll, Krug, and Pettus 
(2007) find that the proportion of fixed and variable incentives within compensation 
plans influences risk-taking, with higher proportions of fixed compensation associated 
with less risk-taking and higher proportions of variable compensation associated with 
more risk-taking. Higher proportions of performance-based short-term cash-based 
compensation are associated with higher levels of risk-taking and performance as well as 
greater financial stability (Guo, Jalal, and Khaksari 2014). Volume-based incentives have 
also been found to increase risk-taking among loan officers through higher acceptance 
and default rates for loans, though deferring partially mitigates this effect (Cole, Kanz, 
and Klapper 2015). For mutual fund managers, the effective fee rate and marginal 
compensation rate are both positively associated with risk-taking behavior (Massa and 
Patgiri 2009). Risk-taking is also negatively associated with performance target 
flexibility, with managers taking on more risk when their performance targets are more 
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easily attainable (Sprinkle, Williamson, and Upton 2008). Kini and Williams (2012) find 
that tournament-style incentives (i.e. incentives where bonuses are rewarded only to top 
performers) increase risk-taking among managers by promoting greater R&D intensity 
and firm leverage. Similarly, compensation plans which incorporate gainsharing, or 
incentives linked employee-drive performance improvements, are positively associated 
with risk-taking (Gomez-Mejia, Welnourne, and Wiseman 2000). Volume-based 
incentives have also been shown to increase managerial risk-taking (Acharya, Amihud, 
and Litov (2011). 
Another method used to better align the incentives and risk preferences of owners 
and those of managers is to include equity-based incentives within managers’ 
compensation contracts, thereby giving managers an ownership interest in the firm 
(Jensen and Murphy 1990). Prior literature provides ample evidence of the effectiveness 
of equity incentives at promoting increased risk-taking among typically risk averse 
managers. Larcker (1983) finds that the adoption of a performance-based equity incentive 
plans is associated with higher levels of capital investment. Managers with higher 
proportions of equity-based compensation take more risk when acquiring firms while 
simultaneously paying lower acquisition premiums (Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman 
2001). Managers holding a higher proportion of unrestricted equity shares also exhibit 
greater risk-taking behavior relative to other managers (Dunham 2012). Similarly, CEOs 
with substantial ownership interest in their firms (i.e. CEOs holding greater than 20% of 
firm stock) engage in greater risk-taking through expansion compared to non-owner 
CEOs (Eisenmann 2002), though this effect is partially offset by the proportion of CEO 
wealth tied up in firm equity (May 1995).  
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Many firms also include stock options as part of their managers’ compensation 
packages. Stock options provide managers with an option to purchase equity shares in the 
firm at a specified strike price: generally, a price higher than the firm’s current stock 
price (i.e. out-of-the-money). Out-of-the-money options, therefore, provide managers 
with a strong incentive to exert effort toward increasing firm value and, by extension, the 
firm’s stock price (Guay 1999; Carpenter 2000). In so doing, options reduce agency 
problems and induce managers to undertake higher levels of risk. Sanders (2001) finds 
that higher levels of CEO stock option holdings are associate with a higher propensity to 
engage in acquisitions and divestitures, an indication of risk-taking behavior. Chen, 
Steiner, and White (2006) provide similar evidence, demonstrating that both accumulated 
options and the proportion of option-based compensation are positively associated with 
managerial risk-taking behavior. The proportion of options-based pay is also positively 
related to investment levels, performance variability, and R&D spending (Sanders and 
Hambrick, 2007; Wu and Tu 2007). By contrast, managers with higher levels of 
unexercisable in-the-money options exhibit greater risk aversion as managers seek to 
avoid stock price reductions in the short term (Brisley 2006). While Hayes, Lemmon, and 
Qiu (2012) provide evidence suggesting that the relationship between options-based pay 
and managerial risk-taking observed in the literature is spurious, Gormley, Matsa, and 
Milbourn (2013) calls this result into question citing early adoption of FAS 123R as a 
potential confounding factor to their analysis. Devers, McNamara, Wiseman, and Arrfelt 
(2008) also note that the magnitude of cash-based compensation has a moderating effect 
on the relationship between equity-based incentives and strategic risk-taking, with high 
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proportions of cash pay reducing risk-taking as the value of exercisable options increases 
and increasing risk-taking as the value of unexercisable options increases. 
The mechanism through which options-based pay influences managerial risk-
taking is their effect on managerial wealth. Prior literature has identified two major 
components of this influence: vega, or the sensitivity of CEO wealth to changes in stock 
volatility, and delta, the sensitivity of CEO wealth to changes in stock price. A variety of 
studies have highlighted the clear positive relationship between vega and managerial risk-
taking. Armstrong and Vashishtha (2012) find that managers increase firm risk-taking 
through increased systematic, rather than idiosyncratic, risk. This suggests that managers 
undertake risks against which can be hedged against through market trading. Belkhir and 
Chazi (2010) demonstrate that the positive relationship between firm risk and vega is 
exponentially decreasing. Additionally, they find that banks tend to adopt lower levels of 
vega overall compared to industrial firms. Higher vegas are also associated with greater 
bank instability, though this effect is offset by increasing the CEO’s pay-share (Bai & 
Elyasiani 2012). Increased risk-taking takes a number of forms, including higher levels of 
leverage and debt financing (Dong, Wang, & Xie 2010), reduced cash holdings (Chava & 
Purnanadam 2010), increased tax aggressiveness (Rego & Wilson 2012), and more 
mergers (Hagendorff & Vallascas 2011). Higher levels of vega are also associated with 
increased expenditures on risky research and development (R&D) and property, plant, 
and equipment (PP&E) (Coles, Daniel, & Naveen 2006; Rajgopal & Shevlin 2002; Shen 
& Zhang 2013). While Rajgopal, Hanlon, and Shevlin (2004) suggest that the economic 
significance of these relationships may be small, they do not dispute their existence.   
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Though higher levels of delta are useful in aligning the incentives of managers 
and shareholders (i.e. higher stock prices and maximizing firm value) and inducing 
greater risk-taking, they also expose managers to increased portfolio and compensation 
risk due to the relatively unbalanced nature of most managers’ portfolios (Coles, Daniel, 
and Naveen 2006). Stock options, therefore, allow owners to structure compensation as a 
convex function of firm performance. This convexity aids the firm in reducing agency 
problems which may be caused by higher levels of vega by curbing extreme levels of 
managerial investment-related risk-taking (Guay 1999).  
 
1.3 Prior Performance and Framing Effects 
Economists have traditionally modeled decision-making as being undertaken by 
rational actors with the goal of maximizing their expected utility at all times. Expected 
Utility Theory, as this model is often named, suggests that mangers consider the 
probability-weighted expected values of their various choices and select the choice which 
maximizes their utility (Larrick 1993). Thus, decisions made under conditions of risk 
remain rational as the probability-weighting process accounts for the relative riskiness of 
decision alternatives. An extensive body of literature, however, provides robust evidence 
revealing that managers’ risk-taking preferences are significantly impacted by prior 
outcomes. Prior outcomes are therefore said to frame current decisions and the 
probability-weighting process, giving rise to framing effects (Kahneman & Tversky 
1982; Kühberger 1998). Several theories have been put forward which purport to 
describe the relationship between situational framing and risk-taking behavior, the most 
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commonly cited of which are prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) and the 
behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March 1963).  
<Table 1.2 About Here> 
Prospect theory proposes that whether a manager prefers one choice to another is 
a function not only of the expected utility of the choice, but also of the reference point to 
which that change in utility is compared (Barberis 2013). Specifically, prospect theory 
describes the phenomenon of loss aversion whereby individuals eschew higher levels of 
expected value in order to reduce variance and avoid losses when their reference point 
involves a gain (i.e. gain framing). By contrast, individuals become more risk seeking 
when their reference point involves a loss, potentially selecting higher variance choices in 
order to realize a high level of return with a low level of probability (i.e. loss framing). 
Figure 2 provides an adapted graphical representation of a prospect theory-based decision 
utility curve as developed by Kahneman & Tversky (1979). Points A and B represent 
points on the utility curve which are subject to gain framing while points C and D 
represent points subject to loss framing. Points A and C are equidistant to the point of 
origin, as are points B and D. Given point A as a reference point, one can see that the 
increased utility realized by a gain to point B is less than the disutility (i.e. loss in utility) 
of a loss to the point of origin. These differences in expected utility give rise to loss 
aversion and suggest that managers under gain framing will seek to protect their gains 
and avoid losses. Conversely, a reference point C will lead to further risk-taking in line 
with the realized utility of a gain from point C to the point of origin being greater than the 
disutility of a loss to point D. This suggest that managers under loss framing will 
undertake greater risk in an effort to reverse their losses. Risk-taking behavior following 
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this basic framework of framing effects has been observed among students (Drake & 
Kohlmeyer 2010), mutual fund traders (Armmann & Verhofen 2009) and commodities 
traders Coval & Shumway 2005) among others.1  
<Insert Figure 1.2 About Here> 
Organizational theorists have developed the behavioral theory of the firm 
(hereafter referred to as behavioral theory) in an attempt to model decision making 
processes within firms, including how organizations, rather than individuals, assess 
operational outcomes (March and Shapira 1987). Behavioral theory (Cyert and March 
1963) posits that decision makers assess profitability by comparing current profit levels 
to reference points in a manner similar to that proposed by prospect theory. Performance 
gaps, or differences between current and reference performance levels, provide useful 
information for planning the operating activities of organizations (Audia and Greve, 
2006). Positive gaps, where current performance exceeds historical or social performance 
level, provide managers with affirmative signals regarding the effectiveness of current 
strategic and tactical plans. This generally leads firms to maintain current plans without 
significant changes rather than considering a wide range of potential alternative plans 
(March and Shapira 1987). Negative gaps, where current performance falls short of 
reference points, signal some problem with current plans which must be addressed. In 
contrast to positive gaps, negative gaps lead organizations to explore alternative courses 
of action which could be used to address the perceived problem of below expectations 
performance (Cyert and March 1963). Problemistic search, as this type of exploratory 
                                               
1 See Kühberger 1998 for a meta-analysis of prior literature demonstrating the robust nature of framing 
effects among individual decision-makers. See also Ricciardi (2008) for a review of behavioral finance 
literature related to prospect theory and framing effects in managerial risk taking. 
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process if called, generally yields a much wider range of alternatives from which the 
organization can choose. Once managers engage in problemistic search and develop a set 
of alternative courses of action for the firm, their preferences for individual alternatives is 
subject to individual risk preferences and cognitive bias as described in prospect theory.  
 While evidence largely supports the predictions of prospect theory for individual 
decision-makers (Abdel-Khalik 2014), results have been mixed when examining risky 
decision making by managers within organizations. Miller & Leiblein (1986), Singh 
(1986), and Bromiley (1991) each provide evidence in favor of the predictions of 
prospect theory and behavioral theory, documenting a strong negative relationship 
between prior performance and subsequent risk-taking. Lee (1997) and Greve (1998) find 
similar results using shareholder letter content and new market entry, respectively. Using 
return-on-equity volatility, Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988) partition firms into those 
with below-expectations and above-expectations performance and find that firms with 
below-expectations performance exhibit a negative relationship between prior 
performance and risk-taking while better performing firms exhibit the opposite 
relationship. Wiseman and Bromiley (1996) finds similar evidence, documenting a 
negative relationship between prior performance and subsequent risk-taking but a 
positive relationship between organizational decline and subsequent risk-taking. Miller 
and Chen (2004) provide longitudinal evidence showing both that a negative relationship 
between prior performance and future risk-taking and reduced risk-taking following 
performance improvements. Greve (2003) finds that strong performance leads to reduced 
R&D intensity and new product launches among a sample of shipbuilding firms. Van 
Wessep and Wang (2014) provide evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of a 
10 
 
 
 
performance-contingent severance pay option at deterring poor performing managers 
from funding projects with a negative expected return, though they still document the 
expected negative relationship between prior performance and risk-taking among such 
managers. 
 Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton (1981) theorize that prior performance can reach a 
sufficiently threatening point such as to induce risk aversion among managers. This 
suggests that managers, when faced with significant organizational loss or threat to the 
existence of the firm, will make less, rather than more, risky choices following prior 
performance. March and Shapira (1987) further theorize that managers focus their 
attention either on bankruptcy or on aspirational benchmarks, with managers either 
seeking to reach aspirational goals or avoid bankruptcy at any given time. Laughhunn, 
Payne, and Crum (1980) find support for this theory in that managers exhibit risk seeking 
behavior following reversible prior performance but risk aversion following potentially 
ruinous poor performance. Thaler & Johnson (1990) further propose that performance 
may also reach a sufficiently strong point such as to allow for increased risk-taking. They 
refer to this phenomenon is referred to as the house money effect. Liu, Tsai, Wang, & 
Zhu (2010) find evidence in support of these predictions from, demonstrating that stock 
traders take more risky positions during afternoon trading sessions following strong 
morning trading sessions. Similar evidence is observed among participants in a mutual 
fund tournament, where interim winners increased the volatility of their portfolio 
following their interim win (Basak & Makarov 2012). Amman & Verhofen (2007) also 
find that mutual fund managers weigh their portfolios toward small, value, and 
momentum stocks while increasing beta and volatility following strong prior-year 
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performance. In a more general industrial context, Chen and Miller (2007) find that firms 
who outperform their peers tend to exhibit risk-seeking behavior following strong 
performance while underperforming firms tend to exhibit loss aversion following poor 
performance. Sullivan and Kida (1995) further find that while managers are willing to 
take on greater risk following prior gains (rather than after prior losses), though risk 
aversion is observed once performance has reached aspirational benchmarks.   
 A number of other studies, however, provide mixed evidence which suggests a 
more nuanced relationship between prior performance and subsequent risk-taking. Audia 
and Greve (2003) find evidence that size moderates the relationship between prior 
performance and risk-taking, with smaller firms decreasing capital expenditures 
following poor performance while large firms increasing such expenditures following 
similarly poor performance. Iyer and Miller (2008) find results which directly contradict 
Fiegenbaum & Thomas (1988), providing evidence that firms exhibit a negative risk-
performance relationship when performance is above expectations and a positive risk-
performance relationship when performance is below expectations using the probability 
of acquisitions as a measure of risk. Gaba & Joseph (2013) find differences at the 
business unit and corporate level, with business units exhibiting a negative risk-
performance relationship and corporations exhibiting a positive risk-performance 
relationship as measured using new product introductions. While Lim and McCann 
(2014) find a negative relationship between prior performance and R&D intensity in 
general, they find that high values of managerial stock options increase risk aversion. 
High values for outside director options, by contrast, appear to strengthen the negative 
relationship between prior performance and R&D intensity, suggesting financial 
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incentive effects may more fully moderate the relationship between prior performance 
and risk-taking behavior.       
 
1.4 Organizational Environment  
 Research has identified a number of environmental variables which influence 
managerial risk-taking. Numerous studies, for example, provide insight into the effect of 
the regulatory environment on managerial risk taking. Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997) 
find that insurance firms took on more risk following the introduction of state guaranty 
funds. Gropp, Gruendl, and Guettler (2014) find similar evidence, documenting a 
decrease in bank risk-taking by cutting off low-quality borrowers following the removal 
of bank guarantees. Gonzalez (2005) further suggests that deposit insurance may help 
offset the risk-reducing effects of regulatory capital restrictions by helping to increase the 
value of bank charters. Creditor rights provisions in local regulations lead banks to 
engage in more diversifying acquisitions designed to reduce cash flow risk and leverage 
(Acharya & Naqvi 2012). Despite these changes, however, Houston, Lin, Lin, and Ma 
(2010) find that stronger creditor rights tend to promote both higher growth and greater 
risk taking. Similarly, higher levels of shareholder power lead to higher levels of firm 
risk-taking in line with the risk preferences of shareholders (Laeven & Levine 2009). 
These higher levels of firm risk-taking are not fully constrained by strong corporate 
governance mechanisms, highlighting the importance of the regulatory environment in 
understanding managerial risk-taking behavior (John, Litov, & Yeung 2008).  
<Table 1.3 About Here> 
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Other types of regulatory activity have been shown to reduce managerial risk-
taking. Anderson & Fraser (2000) find that, while fixed-rate deposit insurance led to 
higher levels of risk-taking among banks, the introduction of risk-adjusted deposit 
insurance successfully reduced risk-taking among banks as compared to the prior 
regulatory regime. Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutter (2010) find that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 decreased firm risk-taking, leading to lower levels of size-adjusted PP&E and R&D 
expenditures, lower earnings volatility, and increased cash holdings. Tax rates also 
impact risk taking, with entrepreneurs taking on less risk when marginal tax rates are 
reduced in line with the reduced tax benefit of potential loss deductions (Cullen & 
Gordon 2007; Mintz 1981). Similarly, interest rates are negatively related to bank risk 
taking (Delis & Kouretas 2011) 
The firm’s competitive environment, particularly the presence of strong 
competition, has also been shown to impact managers’ risk taking. Allen and Gale (2001) 
develop a model which shows that bank portfolio risk is increasing in competition. While 
Grochulski and Kareken (2004) and Boyd & De Nicolo (2005) criticize this result and 
demonstrate conditions under which competition is unrelated to risk taking within the 
banking industry, empirical evidence generally support the idea that competition 
increases risk-taking. De Nicolo (2000) finds that banks increase risk taking in the 
presence of competition as measured using bank concentration as a measure of 
competition. De Nicolo et al. (2004) similarly find that bank fragility is positively related 
to bank concentration. Kim & Lu (2011) highlight an important caveat to this 
relationship, however, in noting that high levels of industry concentration attenuate the 
risk-taking of managers when managers own higher proportions of firm stock. Bannier, 
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Feess, and Packham (2013) note that competition strengthens the positive relationship 
between bonus payments and risk-taking within banks, again suggesting that competition 
has a positive influence on risk-taking.  
As the discussion in Section III suggests, risk-taking is examined as a predictor of 
risk-taking in several prior studies. Bowman (1982) finds that low profit companies are 
more likely to enter into new ventures which increase firm risk: a phenomenon known as 
Bowman’s Paradox. Research into this paradox suffers from methodological issues, 
however, in terms of the risk measures used to demonstrate its existence (Nickel & 
Rodriguez 2002). Firms with fewer growth opportunities have been shown to be more 
likely to “go for broke,” or take on abnormally high levels of risk in an effort to generate 
positive returns for the firm (Herring & Vankudre 1987). More diverse firms tend to 
engage in less risk-taking as compared to less diverse firms, though restructuring 
following periods of poor performance may lead to higher levels of risk-taking within 
more diverse firms. More dynamic operating environments and low levels of 
organizational slack or efficiency are associated with higher levels of managerial risk-
taking as well (Fiordelisi, Marques-Ibanez, and Molyneux 2011; Moses 1992; Palmer & 
Wiseman 1999).  
Numerous other variables have been shown to influence risk-taking by managers. 
Bushman & Williams (2012) find that more transparent disclosure of loan losses has the 
effect of constraining bank risk-taking. By contrast, provisions which allow for earnings 
smoothing lead to greater risk-taking within banks. Firms which exhibit greater 
conservatism (in accounting terms) are associated with lower levels of overall risk-taking 
and a reduced propensity to undertake negative NPV projects (Watts 2003) and fewer 
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acquisitions (Kravet 2014). Holding agents individually accountable for their results 
leads to less risk-taking among managers, suggesting firm culture can influence overall 
risk-taking (Pollmann, Potters, and Trautmann (2014). National culture is also a predictor 
of managerial risk-taking, with countries characterized by more individualism exhibiting 
greater risk-taking and countries with higher uncertainty avoidance or harmony 
exhibiting lower levels of risk-taking (Li, Griffin, Yue, & Zhao 2013).  
 
1.5 Capital Structure 
 Jensen and Meckling (1976), in describing the incentive effects which give rise to 
the agency costs of debt, state the following: 
“Potential creditors will not loan $100,000,000 to a firm in which the entrepreneur 
has an investment of $10,000. With that financial structure the owner-manager 
will have a strong incentive engage in activities (investments) which promise very 
high payoffs if successful even if they have a very low probability of success. If 
they turn out well, he captures most of the gains, if they turn out badly, the 
creditors bear most of the costs” (p. 334). 
 
This intuition gives rise to their theory of the firm, which explains why capital structure 
matters to the overall value of an organization. Researchers have, therefore, recognized 
capital structure as an important factor to consider when examining managerial risk-
taking behavior.   
<Table 1.4 About Here> 
Morck, Schleifer, and Vishny (1988) identify a non-monotonic relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm risk-taking; Risk-taking increases in the 
proportion of ownership below 5% and above 25% of the firm’s equity and decreases in 
the proportion of ownership between 5% and 25%. Lee (2002), however, notes that the 
incentive effects of high levels of insider ownership are stronger in firms which are at 
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lower risk of bankruptcy. Wright, Ferris, Sarin, and Awasthi (1996) provide a contrary 
note that, for firms with access to growth opportunities, institutional ownership is 
positively related to risk-taking while managerial ownership percentage is negatively 
related to risk-taking. Erkens, Hung, and Matos (2012) provide further support for this 
finding, documenting that banks with higher institutional ownership was related to higher 
levels of risk-taking in the lead-up to the financial crisis of 2007-2008. A negative 
relationship between managerial ownership percentage and risk-taking is also observed 
within banks (Chen, Steiner, & Whyte 1998; Iannota, Nocera, & Sironi 2007), supporting 
Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) intuition that providing managers an ownership stake in 
the firm can help offset the incentive effect of outside debt. Sauders, Strock, and Travlos 
(1990) find that banks controlled by shareholders, rather than management, take on 
greater levels of risk during a period of deregulation. Bova, Kolev, Thomas, and Zhang 
(2015) also find that non-executive stock holdings are negatively related to firm risk-
taking, suggesting that inside ownership impacts firm risk-taking regardless of whether it 
involves executive or non-executive ownership.  
While strong bondholder governance has been identified a motivating managers 
to adopt less risky behavior (King & Wen 2011) and operate the firm more efficiently 
(Jensen 1986), some types of bonds draw more bondholder scrutiny than others. 
Subordinated debt has, therefore, been examined as a sub-category of outside debt which 
is more likely to invite disciplining forces from the marketplace due to the increased 
default risk creditors face when purchasing subordinated bonds or making subordinated 
loans (Niu 2008). Blum (2002) finds that subordinated debt reduces debt in cases where 
banks can credibly commit to a specific level of risk. Otherwise, subordinated debt 
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created similar increases in risk-taking as senior debt. By contrast, Niu (2008) finds that 
banks tend to shift their resources toward less risky assets, thereby reducing risk-taking 
after issuing subordinated debt. They attribute this behavior to increased scrutiny from 
junior debtholders. Krishnan, Ritchken, and Thomson (2005) reject both of these 
interpretations, however, finding a lack of evidence that subordinated debt increases 
external monitoring or has any effect on bank risk-taking. Nguyen (2013) identifies 
appropriate regulation and economic development as necessary conditions for 
subordinated debt to have a disciplining effect on bank risk-taking.   
Other researchers consider the impact of inside debt, such as defined pension 
obligations and deferred compensation, on the risk-taking behavior of management. 
Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart (2012) find that inside debt holdings tend to reduce 
risk through lower levels of R&D spending, leverage, and return volatility. They also find 
that firms with higher levels of insider debt tend to be more diversified and have greater 
liquidity. Choy, Lin, and Officer (2014) find that freezing defined benefit plans leads to 
an increase in overall risk as measured by firm beta, earnings volatility, equity risk, and 
credit risk. In addition, investments tend to shift away from less risky PP&E toward more 
risky R&D expenditures after firms freeze their defined benefit plans.  
   
1.6 Corporate Governance and Monitoring 
 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance as “the ways in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment” (pp. 737). While creditors are able to utilize debt covenants to monitor 
corporations on an ongoing basis, shareholders elect a board of directors and implement 
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corporate governance policies meant to monitor and control management. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Fama (1980), among others, highlight the importance internal 
corporate governance mechanisms in reducing agency costs associated with large 
corporations and diffuse ownership structures, particularly managerial risk-taking 
behavior.  
<Table 1.5 About Here> 
 Researchers have highlighted the importance of the board of directors, those 
elected by shareholders to monitor management, in influencing the risk-taking behavior 
of management.  Pathan (2009) finds that strong boards (i.e. smaller boards and boards 
which have less restrictive shareholder rights provisions) which better represent the 
interests of shareholders are associated with higher levels of systematic and idiosyncratic 
risk-taking in banks. By contrast, CEO power is negatively related to such risk-taking. 
Wang (2012) documents evidence that smaller boards are associated with lower levels of 
leverage but more risky investments. Focusing on audit committee members, Sun and Liu 
(2014) find that audit committees made up of long tenured board members constrain risk-
taking while those made up of busy board members are associated with greater 
managerial risk-taking. Berger, Kick, and Schaeck (2014) find that changes to the board 
which increase the proportion of women directors appear to increase risk-taking while 
changes that increase the number of PhD-holding academic board members to decrease 
risk-taking. Staggered boards also to influence risk-taking, with managers entrenched in 
companies with staggered board being associated with less stock volatility compared to 
managers in companies without staggered boards (Chintrakarn, Jiraporn, & Jiraporn 
2013). Jiraporn, Chatjuthamard, Tong, and Kim (2015) find that greater board 
19 
 
 
 
independence, as evidenced by a larger proportion of board members without 
management ties, is associated with less risk-taking by management.  
 One mechanism through which the board of directors influences managerial risk-
taking is through compensation control. Corporate governance policies have been shown 
to impact the ability of the board to control executive compensation within firms. Core, 
Holthauser, and Larcker (1999) find that poor corporate governance mechanisms reduce 
the ability of boards to control executive pay, leading to managerial rent extraction 
through abnormally high pay. This weakens the incentive alignment effects of option-
based pay, in particular, and promotes less risk-taking than shareholders may prefer. 
Similarly, Cyert, Kang, and Kumar (2002) find that boards whose directors hold a higher 
proportion of firm equity exercise better control over CEO option pay and, by extension, 
perform their role as monitors of management more effectively.  
 Boards also set corporate governance policies for the firm which influence 
managerial risk-taking. Ferreira and Laux (2007) find that firms with fewer antitakeover 
provisions, a sign of stronger corporate governance mechanisms, exhibit higher levels of 
idiosyncratic risk compared to other firms. Jiraporn et al. (2015), using Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS) scores for a variety of firms, document a negative relationship 
between corporate governance policy strength and firm risk-taking. Boards which utilize 
means-focused or behavioral, rather than outcome-focused, measures in assessing 
management performance constrain risk-taking by forcing management to accept higher 
levels of compensation risk (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia 1998). The board may also curb 
managerial risk-taking by implementing stronger risk management functions which are 
20 
 
 
 
directly accountable to the board of directors rather than to management (Ellul & 
Yerramilli 2013). 
 
1.7 Individual Differences 
 Prior research has also identified a number of personal traits and individual 
characteristics, both psychological and physiological, which can influence a manager’s 
risk-taking behavior. Most prevalent among this is the well-documented difference 
between genders in risk-taking attitudes and propensity (Charness & Gneezy 2012). In a 
meta-analysis of 150 studies related to gender differences in risk-taking behavior, Byrnes, 
Miller, and Schafer (1999) find that men exhibit both significantly higher risk propensity 
and observed risky behavior as compared to women across a variety of hypothetical and 
observed behaviors. In particular, men were more likely to engage in risky experiments 
and intellectual risk-taking such as might be seen among professional managers. The 
authors note, however, that gender differences appear to be declining over time. Charness 
and Gneezy (2012) similarly find a persistent gender gap between men and women in the 
performance of a financial investment task, with women consistently investing less and 
taking less financial risk compared to men. Hardies, Breesch, and Branson (2013) help 
rule out socialization differences, finding that gender gaps in risk-taking behavior are 
relatively symmetric between female-dominated and male-dominated fields despite the 
effectiveness of such socialization at eliminating differences in overconfidence between 
men and women. Powell and Ansic (1997) obtain results which rule out task familiarity, 
framing effects, situational costs, or descriptive ambiguity as explanations for the 
persistent gender gap in risk-taking. Instead, they attribute differences in risk-taking to 
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strategy selection differences. Dwyer, Gilkeson, and List (2002) find that knowledge gaps 
between men and women in the mutual fund industry helped explain some, but not all, 
variation in risk-taking between men and women. Powell & Ansic (1997), however, find 
that differences in strategy selection do not appear to impact task performance.  
<Table 1.6 About Here> 
 Seo, Goldfarb, and Barrett (2010) state that “a growing body of research suggests 
that human affect is an important individual-level factor that influences both risk 
perception and risk choice” (pp. 411). Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch (2001), in a 
review of literature related to the relationship between affect and risk, develop a model of 
behavior in which emotional reactions can subsume rational, cognitive reactions to 
situations involving decision making under risk. Shiv, Loewenstein, Bechara, Damasio, 
and Damasio (2005) support this intuition and find that dysfunction in the areas of the 
brain which control emotion can lead to superior decision making as such issues free 
individuals from the biasing effects of prior performance. Delgado-Garcia, Fuente-
Sabate, and Quevedo-Puente (2010), using a sample of Spanish CEOs, finds that negative 
affective traits are associated with lower risk-taking as measured by credit risk, loan 
portfolio composition, and outcome variability. By contrast, positive affective traits do 
not appear to influence risk-taking behavior using the same metrics. Moreno, Kida, and 
Smith (2002), however, show that managers are more likely to select riskier choices 
when such choices elicit a positive affective response. Affective responses can be 
sufficiently strong as to cause risk-taking in gain contexts and risk-avoidance in loss 
context. Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) find results which demonstrate that individuals 
prefer affect-laden choices under risky conditions. Seo et al. (2010) identify affective 
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states unrelated to specific risk-related choices as having a moderating effect on risk-
taking. Positive affect helped eliminate the tendency to become risk-averse in gain-
framed situations while negative affective states attenuated the tendency to become risk-
seeking in loss-framed situations.  
 Other researchers have examined several cognitive biases, aside from framing 
effects, which also impact risk-taking behavior. Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) exhibit 
systematic biases in their consideration of current choices such that they tend to isolate 
such choices from future opportunities and prior outcomes. These biases can lead to 
suboptimal risk-taking from a shareholder perspective as managers persistently 
miscalculate the expected value of present choices. Managers also exhibit myopic loss 
aversion, a phenomenon in which managers focus more on avoiding losses than realizing 
gains and, thus, become overly concerned with short-term performance (Benartzi & 
Thaler 1995).  Gneezy and Potters (1997) demonstrate that forcing managers to evaluate 
their returns more frequently leads to more myopic loss aversion. Forlani (2002) finds 
that managers’ perceived outcome control also influences their propensity to take risk, 
with managers perceiving a low level of outcome control undertaking greater levels of 
risk under a loss frame and managers perceiving a high level of outcome control 
undertaking greater levels of risk under a gain frame. Lehman and Hahn (2013), using 
data from the National Football League, show that perceptions of momentum, defined as 
“a sustained and systematic trajectory in performance over time” (pp. 852), impact risk-
taking. Their results demonstrate that within-period momentum leads to a weakening of 
the risk-performance relationship when momentum valence (i.e. positive or negative 
momentum) conflicts with frame valence (i.e. loss or gain situational frame).   
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Researchers have identified other personal concerns which can impact managerial 
risk-taking. Chakraborty, Sheikh, and Subramanian (2007) identify a negative 
relationship between termination risk and risk-taking, an effect they note overwhelms the 
usual risk-promoting effects of equity and options-based compensation incentives. The 
authors suggest the strength of this effect comes from the higher risk of termination 
associated with failed investments, thus leading managers to specifically avoid risky 
investments when termination risk is high. Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009) find a more 
general relationship between employment risk and risk-taking among managers based on 
their relative consideration of compensation incentives and employment risk. Contingent 
upon prior poor performance, managers increase risk-taking when employment risk is 
low and decrease risk-taking when employment risk is relatively high. This effect is 
attributed to the desire for mutual fund managers to “catch up” following a period of poor 
performance. Konrad & Lommerud (1993) identify status seeking as having a significant 
impact on risk-taking. Specifically, status seeking leads managers to undertake higher 
levels of systematic risk. By contrast, managers who seek status tend to increase 
idiosyncratic risk when their consumption utility function is less concave and decrease 
idiosyncratic risk when their consumption utility function is more concave.  
 Numerous studies have identified personal characteristics which influence risk-
taking behavior. MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1990) identify several categories of 
personal traits, including success (including authority, income, wealth, and position) and 
maturity (including age, seniority, and number of dependents). They find that success is 
positively associated with greater risk-taking in investment activity while maturity 
reduced the propensity to take risks and more cautious overall. Sahm (2012) provides 
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further insight into this result in noting that higher socioeconomic status increases risk 
tolerance, thereby allowing such individuals to more comfortably take on investment risk. 
Stenstrom and Saad (2011) provide evidence that higher levels of testosterone lead 
managers to take on higher levels of risk. Menkhoff, Schmidt, and Brozynski (2006) find 
that more experienced managers take on less risk than inexperienced managers in a 
mutual fund setting. Li and Tang (2010) identify hubris as having a positive relationship 
with risk-taking, with managers who have a high degree of discretion in their decision-
making process and high levels of hubris undertaking the highest levels of risk compared 
to all other individuals. Sitkin and Weingart (1995) highlight the importance of risk 
perception and risk propensity to overall risk-taking. They find that individuals with a 
higher propensity for risk-taking, while they do not necessarily engage in more risk-
taking, are less likely to perceive a situation as being risky. Given that risk perception is 
negatively related to risk-taking, it becomes clear that ensuring managers see risk where 
it exists should be viewed as critical to the decision-making processes within 
organizations.  
 Additionally, organization or establishment-level characteristics have been shown 
to influence risk-taking behavior. McNamara and Bromiley (1997) find that bank 
branches which are higher performing are more likely to overrate the creditworthiness of 
borrowers compared to poorer-performing branches. This phenomenon is exacerbated by 
the presence of higher levels of organizational process standardization. Mihet (2013) 
notes that low uncertainty aversion, low tolerance for hierarchical relationships, and high 
individualism within cultures are all associated with higher levels of risk-taking among 
individuals and organizations. Furthermore, risk-taking appears to be aligned with an 
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organizations country of origin for foreign firms, providing insight into how researchers 
should account for culture when considering risk-taking. Despite the benefits of risk-
taking in family firms for proactiveness and innovation, family firms tend to take 
significantly less risks as compared to non-family firms (Naldi, Nordqvist, Sjoberg, & 
Wikund (2007). Finally, local religion for mutual funds appears to be correlated with 
fund risk-taking metrics. Areas with low concentrations of Protestants or high 
concentrations of Catholics are associated with higher return volatility, higher portfolio 
concentrations, higher portfolio turnover, more aggressive trading, and more tournament 
risk-shifting behaviors (Shu, Sulaeman, & Yeung 2012). 
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Figure 1.1: Determinants of Managerial Risk-Taking 
 
         
Managerial 
Risk-Taking
Capital 
Structure
Compensation 
and Incentives
Environmental 
Issues
Corporate 
Governance 
and Monitoring
Individual 
Differences
Prior 
Performance
27 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Prospect Theory Utility Function 
 
Source: http://ui-patterns.com/patterns/Loss-aversion (adapted from Kahneman & Tversky 1979) 
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Table 1.1: Compensation and Incentive Studies 
 
Author(s)/Year Methodology Industry Key Findings 
Acharya et al. 2011 Analytical Banking Volume-based incentives promote risk-taking by lending 
officers within banks. The macroeconomic impact of this risk-
taking inflates asset values and pushes depositors to the safety 
of banks, leaving banks highly liquid and thereby insulating 
bankers from the effects of their risky decisions.  
Armstrong and Vashishtha 2012 Archival Cross-Sectional Vega is associated with increased systematic, rather than 
idiosyncratic, risk taking. 
Armstrong et al. 2013 Archival Cross-Sectional Vega is positively associated with misreporting (i.e. reporting 
related risk-taking) while delta is not related when jointly 
considering both effects. Vega effects appear to overwhelm 
delta effects. 
Bai and Elyasiani 2013 Archival Banking Vega is negatively related to bank stability, with higher vega 
increasing risk and higher risk increasing Vega. Higher levels 
of CEO pay-share appear to reduce risk-taking and increase 
bank stability. 
Belkhir and Chazi 2010 Archival Cross-Sectional Delta and vega are positively related to risk-taking among 
bank holding companies. The positive relationship between 
vega and firm risk is exponentially decreasing. 
Brisley 2006 Analytical N/A In-the-money options increase managerial risk aversion in 
project selection due to periodic vesting. Tying the portion of 
options which periodically vest to stock price can provide 
incentives for managerial risk taking. 
Carpenter 2000 Analytical N/A Convex compensation schemes involving call options 
promote extreme outcomes, either deep-in or deep-out-of-the-
money outcomes. Risk-taking varies dynamically with asset 
value, with out-of-the-money options inducing greater risk 
taking. 
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Author(s)/Year Methodology Industry Key Findings 
Chava and Purnanadam 2010 Archival Cross-Sectional CEO vega is positively related with firm leverage and lower 
cash balances, while CEO delta shows the opposite results. 
CFO delta is positively related to longer debt maturities and 
lower levels of earnings-smoothing, while CFO vega shows 
the opposite results. 
Chen et al. 2006 Archival Banking Accumulated options and the proportion of option-based 
compensation are positively related to managerial risk-taking. 
Cole et al.. 2015 Experimental Banking Performance-based incentives that reward lending volume 
lead to higher acceptance rates and higher default rates for 
loans. Incentives targeted at inducing effort lead to more 
profitable lending through superior loan screening and lower 
default rates. Personality traits related to risk do not appear to 
impact this effect, though deferred compensation does. 
Coles et al. 2006 Archival Cross-Sectional CEO vega is positively related to R&D investment, PPE 
investment, and higher leverage. Policy choices are also 
impacted by CEO vega, with compensation structures adopted 
containing higher vega and lower delta for other employees.  
Datta et al. 2001 Archival Cross-Sectional Managers with higher proportions of equity-based 
compensation pay lower acquisition premiums while 
acquiring riskier firms with more growth opportunities. 
Devers et al. 2008 Archival Cross-Sectional CEO compensation is related to strategic risk-taking in firms. 
Equity compensation appears to have an effect on strategic 
risk-taking, though that effect depends on the structure of 
equity compensation and the magnitude of cash 
compensation. Return volatility and governance also appear 
to moderate the effect of equity compensation on risk taking. 
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Author(s)/Year Methodology Industry Key Findings 
Dong et al. 2010 Archival Banking CEO vega influences risk-taking through increased 
preferences for capital raising through debt rather than equity. 
This effect holds regardless of whether the firm is initially 
underlevered or overlevered. 
Dunham 2012 Archival Cross-Sectional The composition of CEO equity non-option holdings 
(restricted vs. unrestricted) impacts firm risk, with higher 
proportions of unrestricted shares increasing risk-taking and 
vice-versa. 
Eisenmann 2002 Archival Cable 
Companies 
CEO equity ownership percentage increases risk-taking, with 
owner-CEOs (CEOs with more than 20% of the equity of the 
firm) exhibiting a lower propensity to exit the business and a 
greater propensity to expand at all levels of market 
turbulence.  
Gomez-Mejia et al. 2000 Theoretical N/A Gainsharing increases risk taking relative to individual 
incentives. Actual compensation relative to expected 
compensation may increase risk-taking due to loss framing of 
gainsharing rewards. 
Gormley et al. 2013 Experimental Cross-Sectional Reduced convexity in option-based pay leads to greater risk-
reduction within firms through reduced leverage and R&D 
investments, increased cash holdings, and a higher probability 
of diversifying acquisitions. 
Guay 1999 Archival Cross-Sectional Firms increase the sensitivity of CEO's wealth to equity risk 
using stock options in the presence of investment 
opportunities. Firm risk is positively related to CEO vega.  
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Author(s)/Year Methodology Industry Key Findings 
Guo et al. 2014 Archival Banking Bank risk, measured using distance from bankruptcy and 
stock return volatility, increase in the percentages of short and 
long-term performance-based compensation. Banks were less 
likely to fail, however, in the presence of performance-based 
compensation. Performance-based pay is positively related to 
firm value and performance. 
Hagendorff and Vallascas 2011 Archival Banking CEOs vega is positively related to the prevalence of risk-
inducing mergers.  
Hayes et al. 2012 Archival Cross-Sectional FAS 123R resulted in a reduced use of stock options in 
compensation contracts for CEO.  This reduction is not 
associated with a reduction in firm risk, suggesting that option 
pay is not related to firm risk. 
Kini and Williams 2012 Archival Cross-Sectional Tournament incentives increase risk taking through higher 
R&D intensity, firm focus, and leverage. Capital expenditure 
intensity is reduced by tournament incentives, however. 
 
Larcker 1983 Archival Cross-Sectional The adoption of a performance plan associated with executive 
compensation contracts increases corporate capital 
investment. 
Massa & Patgiri 2009 Archival Mutual Funds The marginal compensation rate and effective fee rate of 
mutual funds are both positively related with managerial risk 
taking.  
May 1995 Archival Cross-Sectional CEOs with more personal wealth tied up in firm equity take 
less risk through firm acquisitions. CEO tenure is positively 
related to diversification activities.  
Rajgopal & Shevlin 2002 Archival Oil & Gas The sensitivity of CEO options to stock return volatility is 
positively related to risk taking related to new reserve 
exploration among oil and gas companies. These same 
incentives also reduce oil price hedging. 
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Author(s)/Year Methodology Industry Key Findings 
Rajgopal et al. 2004 Archival Cross-Sectional The sensitivity of CEO options to stock return volatility is 
positively related to risk taking. These effects are not large 
and are of questionable economic significance.  
Rego and Wilson 2012 Archival Cross-Sectional Equity risk incentives (vega) increase tax aggressiveness in an 
economically significant manner. 
Sanders & Hambrick 2007 Archival Cross-Sectional CEO stock options (proportion of total pay) are associated 
with higher investment levels and more extreme performance 
observations, suggesting a positive relationship between stock 
options and risk-taking. 
Sanders 2001 Archival Cross-Sectional CEO stock ownership and stock options have opposite effects 
on risk taking, with stock ownership (options) reduced 
(increased) acquisitions and divestitures.  
Shen and Zhang 2013 Archival Cross-Sectional Higher CEO vega is associated with overinvestment in R&D 
as measured by subsequent returns to current R&D 
investment. 
Sprinkle et al. 2008 Experimental N/A Budget flexibility impacts managerial risk-taking, with low 
budgets (i.e. easy to attain budgets) inducing risk-taking while 
high budgets induce risk aversion. Managers appear to give 
up wealth in order to meet budget targets. 
Wright et al. 2007 Archival Cross-Sectional Fixed (variable) compensation incentives among top 
management team members are negatively (positively) 
associated with firm risk taking.  
Wu & Tu 2007 Archival Cross-Sectional The positive relationship between CEO stock option pay and 
R&D spending observed in prior research is stronger among 
firms with slack resources and strong performance. 
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Table 1.2: Prior Performance and Framing Effects Studies 
 
Author(s)/Year Methodology Industry Key Findings 
Ammann & Verhofen 2007 Archival Mutual Funds Prior performance is positively related to future risk taking 
through increased volatility, beta, tracking error, and 
portfolio weighting toward small, value, and momentum 
stocks. 
Ammann & Verhofen 2009 Archival Mutual Funds Successful managers increase risk taking through increased 
volatility and portfolio weighting toward small, value, and 
momentum stocks in the second half of the year when 
performance is low in the first half of the year. 
Unsuccessful managers, by contrast, tend to do so only 
through tracking error increases. 
Audia & Greve 2003 Archival Shipbuilding Large firms increase risk following periods of poor 
performance by increasing investment in factory 
expansions. Small firms, by contrast, decrease risk-taking 
by decreasing factory expansion. 
Basak & Makarov 2012 Analytical Mutual Funds Despite theoretical predictions to the contrary, interim 
winners (i.e. prior strong performance) in a mutual fund 
tournament increase portfolio volatility following their 
interim win. 
Bromiley 1991 Archival Manufacturing Poor prior performance leads to increased risk taking. Low 
organizational slack also leads to increased risk taking. 
Chakraborty et al. 2007 Archival Cross-
Sectional 
Termination risk is negatively associated with risk-taking. 
This effect overwhelms the risk-promoting effects of 
compensation convexity among CEOs facing termination 
related to investment failures. Delta is negatively related to 
risk-taking. 
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Author(s)/Year Methodology Industry Key Findings 
Chen & Miller 2007 Archival Manufacturing Poor performance relative to industry peers leads to greater 
risk taking. Low organizational slack leads to increased risk 
taking. Outperformers appear to increase risk-taking in 
response to strong performance, while underperformers 
appear to decrease risk taking in response to poor 
performance. 
 
Coval & Shumway 2005 Archival Commodities Traders adopt more risky positions in the afternoon after 
experiencing losses in the morning trading session. 
Drake & Kohlmeyer 2010 Experimental N/A MBA students select more risky projects following 
negative performance. Bonus incentives exacerbate this 
effect, leading to greater levels of risk taking. 
Fiegenbaum & Thomas 1988 Archival Cross-
Sectional 
Poor performing firms adopt a negative relationship 
between risk taking and prior performance, while strong 
performing firms adopt a positive relationship between risk 
taking and prior performance. 
Gaba & Joseph 2013 Archival Mobile 
Devices 
Poor performance at the business unit level is associated 
with increased rates of new product introductions. Poor 
performance at the corporate level is associated with lower 
rates of new product introductions, though this effect is 
attenuated for business units that generate a significant 
share of corporate income. 
Greve  1998 Archival Shipbuilding Strong performance reduces R&D intensity and 
introductions of new innovations while organizational slack 
is positively related to R&D intensity. 
Greve 2003 Archival Radio Strong performance reduces the probability of risky 
organizational change. 
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Author(s)/Year Methodology Industry Key Findings 
Iyer & Miller 2008 Archival Manufacturing Risk taking through acquisitions is positively related to 
performance when performance is below expectations, but 
negatively related to performance when performance is 
above expectations. Slack is positively related to 
performance above aspirations. 
Kahneman & Tversky 1979 Experimental N/A Prior performance framing, in terms of gains and losses, 
impacts risk taking. Losses induce risk taking while gains 
induce risk aversion. 
Kempf et al. 2009 Archival Mutual Funds Employment risk and compensation incentives both 
influence managerial risk taking.  Managers decrease risk 
taking following poor performance when employment risk 
is more important than compensation incentives, while risk 
taking increases when compensation incentives are more 
important than employment risk. 
Laughhunn et al. 1980 Archival Cross-
Sectional 
When performance is perceived as reversible, managers 
exhibit risk seeking behavior. When poor performance is 
potentially ruinous, managers exhibit risk aversion. 
Lee 1997 Archival Brewing Poor performance is associated with higher levels of risk 
taking. 
Lehman & Hahn 2013 Archival Football Momentum shapes perceptions of performance through the 
recency effect and other cognitive biases. Within-period 
momentum appears to weaken the risk-performance 
relationship when momentum valence aligns with 
performance valence. 
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Author(s)/Year Methodology Industry Key Findings 
Lim & McCann 2014 Archival Manufacturing High levels of stock option values moderate the 
relationship between prior performance and risk taking 
(measured by R&D intensity) in managers. Poor 
performance is negatively related to risk taking in general, 
but high values of options appear to lead to increased risk 
aversion. The opposite is true for strong performance. 
Outside director options, however, appear to strengthen the 
negative relationship between prior performance and risk 
taking. 
Liu et al. 2010 Archival Stock Trading Strong morning trading outcomes lead to increased risk 
taking in afternoon trading sessions. 
March & Shapira 1987 Theoretical N/A Managers focus their attention on either bankruptcy or 
aspiration levels (i.e. benchmarks), not both 
simultaneously. The probability of attending to an 
aspiration or survival point depends on the distance from 
the point and whether or not the point has been reached. 
Miller and Chen 2004 Archival Cross-
Sectional 
Poor performance is associated with higher levels of risk 
taking. Improved performance is associated with less risk 
taking.  Test of March & Shapira (1987) 
Miller and Leiblein 1986 Archival Cross-
Sectional 
Performance is negatively related with future downside 
risk. Slack is positively related to subsequent downside 
risk. Slack enhances the negative relationship between prior 
performance and subsequent risk taking. 
Singh 1986 Archival Cross-
Sectional 
Prior performance is negatively related to future risk 
taking. Slack and decentralization both moderate this 
relationship, with high levels of either leading to increased 
risk taking. 
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Author(s)/Year Methodology Industry Key Findings 
Staw et al. 1981 Theoretical N/A Threats to the organization which suggest impending loss 
or cost to the entity initiate restrictions of information and 
constrictions in control which, in turn, lead the organization 
to prefer well-learned or dominant responses that are 
familiar.  This reduces problemistic search which, in turn, 
reduces risk taking. 
Sullivan & Kida 1995 Experimental N/A Managers exhibit greater willingness to take risks after 
prior gains as opposed to after prior losses. When 
performance is above reference points, managers exhibit 
risk aversion. When available alternatives are between 
current and target performance levels, risk taking and risk 
aversion can both be exhibited. 
Thaler & Johnson 1990 Experimental N/A People exhibit risk seeking in the presence of prior gains 
(house money effect). People exhibit risk aversion 
following prior losses when future options do not allow for 
breaking even. People exhibit "beak-even effects" in the 
presence of prior losses, where they seek out opportunities 
to break even. 
van Wessep & Wang 2014 Analytical N/A While poor performance may induce subsequent risk taking 
among executives, the use of a performance-contingent 
severance pay option can avoid negative NPV project 
selection among poor performing executives. 
Wiseman & Bromiley 1996 Archival Manufacturing Organizational decline and potential slack are positively 
associated with firm risk taking. Prior performance to 
aspirations and recoverable slack is negatively related to 
risk taking. 
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Table 1.3: Organizational Environment Studies 
 
Author(s)/Year Methodology Industry Key Findings 
Acharya & Naqvi 2012 Archival Cross-
Sectional 
Creditor-rights provision in local regulations are associated 
with higher probability of diversifying acquisitions intended 
to reduce cash-flow risk and leverage. 
Anderson & Fraser 2000 Archival Banking Managerial shareholdings were positively related to risk-
taking during a period of high financial stress for the banking 
industry. This relationship became negative following 
regulation changes designed to reduce risk-taking. 
Bannier et al. 2013 Analytical Banking Bonus payments are positively related to bank risk-taking. 
This relationship is increasing in the presence of 
competition.  
Bargeron et al. 2010 Archival Cross-
Sectional 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act reduced firm risk-taking. This 
reduction was influenced by firm size, board structure, and 
R&D expenditures. 
Bowman 1982 Archival Cross-
Sectional 
Low-profit companies are more likely to enter into new 
ventures which increase firm risk. 
Boyd and De Nicolo 2005 Mixed Banking Both empirical and analytical evidence related to the 
relationship between competition and risk-taking in the 
banking industry are fragile and provide mixed evidence for 
the relationship. While numerous papers conclude the 
relationship is positive, numerous incentive mechanisms 
exist which suggest the relationship is actually negative. 
Bushman & Williams 2012 Archival Banking Loan loss accounting influences bank risk taking, with more 
transparent disclosure of loan losses constraining bank risk-
taking and provisions designed to smooth earnings leading to 
increased loan-related risk taking. 
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Author(s)/Year Methodology Industry Key Findings 
Delis & Kouretas 2011 Archival Banking Interest rates are negatively associated with bank-risk taking. 
Esty 1998 Archival Cross-
Sectional 
More strict contingent liability reporting rules are associated 
with less risky asset holdings and less risk taking following 
periods of poor performance.  
Fiordelisi et al. 2011 Archival Banking Lower levels of efficiency within banks is associated with 
higher levels of risk taking. 
Gonzalez 2005 Archival Banking Regulatory restrictions imposed on banks reduce bank 
charter value and, consequently, increase bank risk taking. 
Deposit insurance may mitigate this increase in risk-taking 
incentives by increasing bank charter values. 
Grochulski & Kareken 2004 Analytical Banking Unlike results from prior research, the authors develop a 
model which demonstrates that competition is unrelated to 
bank risk taking. 
Gropp et al. 2014 Experimental Banking Removing bank guarantees led banks to cut off credit to the 
least creditworthy borrowers, thereby reducing bank risk 
taking. Additionally, banks shifted liabilities away from risk-
sensitive debt instruments following the bank guarantee cut-
off. 
Herring & Vankudre 1987 Analytical N/A Growth opportunities influence managerial risk taking, with 
low growth opportunity firms being more likely to engage in 
"go-for-broke" behavior.  
Hoskisson et al. 1991 Theoretical N/A Firm diversification has an effect on managerial risk taking, 
though the nature of this effect changes depending on the 
extent and type of diversification. Limited diversification 
increases managerial risk taking while more extensive 
diversification reduces risk taking due to control loss. 
Restructuring of diversified firms due to poor performance 
may, however, lead to an increase in managerial risk taking 
following restructuring. 
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Author(s)/Year Methodology Industry Key Findings 
Houston et al. 2010 Archival Banking Stronger creditor rights increase bank risk taking and, by 
extension, the risk of financial crisis and growth rates. 
Information sharing, by contrast, reduces bank risk and 
financial crisis risk.  
John et al. 2008 Archival Cross-
Sectional 
Investor protections embedded within local laws are 
positively associated with corporate risk-taking and firm 
growth rates. Corporate governance policies do not appear to 
fully constrain this effect. 
Kim and Lu 2011 Archival Cross-
Sectional 
CEO ownership exhibits a convex relationship with R&D 
investment when external governance is weak, but no 
relationship when external governance is strong.  This 
suggests external governance can be effective at mitigating 
agency problems. 
Kravet 2014 Archival Cross-
Sectional 
Accounting conservatism is associated with lower levels of 
firm risk taking in the form of fewer acquisitions. This effect 
is driven by firms with accounting-based debt covenants. 
Laeven & Levine 2009 Archival Banking Risk taking is positively related to the relative power of 
shareholders versus managers, with more shareholder power 
increasing risk taking. The impact of regulation on risk 
taking is also dependent on ownership concentration. 
Lee et al. 1997 Archival Insurance The introduction of state guaranty funds is associated with 
increased risk taking among stock property-liability 
insurance firms impacted by the funds. 
Li et al. 2013 Archival Cross-
Sectional 
Cultural dimensions are related to firm risk-taking cross 
countries. Individualism increases risk taking while 
uncertainty avoidance and harmony decrease risk taking. 
Mintz 1981 Analytical N/A Full loss offset corporate tax with interest deductibility leads 
entrepreneurs to decrease investment in risky projects, 
thereby reducing entrepreneurial risk taking. 
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Author(s)/Year Methodology Industry Key Findings 
Moses 1992 Archival Aerospace Increased organizational slack, measures through working 
capital and expenses, is associated with more risky 
penetration pricing strategies.  
Nickel & Rodriguez 2002 Theoretical Cross-
Sectional 
The results of Bowman (1982) are reviewed in this article, 
with subsequent papers providing mixed evidence in support 
of the contention that poor performing firms take greater 
risks. 
Palmer & Wiseman 1999 Archival Cross-
Sectional 
Numerous factors influence managerial risk taking. 
Organizational slack is negatively related to managerial risk 
taking, while managerial equity ownership is positively 
related to managerial risk taking. Greater environmental 
dynamism, greater previous risk taking, higher prior 
performance, and more heterogeneous top management team 
backgrounds are all associated with higher levels of 
managerial risk taking.  
Pollmann et al. 2014 Experimental N/A Accountability leads to less risky investment selections by 
agents on behalf of principals. Ex-ante accountability 
appears to be more effective at reducing risk-taking than ex-
post accountability. 
Watts 2003 Theoretical Cross-
Sectional 
Accounting conservatism is associated with lower levels of 
firm risk taking as indicated by the reduced propensity to 
make negative NPV investments. 
 
4
2
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.4: Capital Structure Studies 
 
Author(s)/Year Methodology Industry Key Findings 
Blum 2002 Analytical N/A Subordinated debt reduces risk only if banks can credibly commit 
to a given level of risk. Otherwise, subordinated debt leads to an 
increase in risk taking. 
Bova et al. 2015 Archival Cross-Sectional Similar to managerial ownership of stock and options, non-
executive stock (option) holdings are negatively (positively) 
related to firm risk.  
Cassell et al. 2012 Archival Cross-Sectional Inside debt holdings (pension benefits/deferred compensation) 
reduce firm risk taking in the form of return volatility, leverage, 
and R&D expenditures while increasing diversification and asset 
liquidity. 
Chen et al. 1998 Archival Banking Managerial ownership is negatively related with depository 
institution risk. 
Choy et al. 2014 Archival Cross-Sectional Freezing defined benefit plans (i.e. reducing inside debt holdings 
for CEOs) leads to an increase in total risk as measured by firm 
beta, credit risk, equity risk, and earnings volatility. Investments 
shift from CAPX to more risky R&D while leverage also 
increases post-freeze. 
Erkens et al. 2012 Archival Banking Institutional ownership was positively related to bank risk-taking 
in the lead-up to the financial crisis of 2007-2008 compared to 
other banks. 
Iannota et al. 2007 Archival Banking Ownership concentration is negatively associated with bank risk-
taking, as measured through loan quality, insolvency risk, and 
asset risk. 
Jensen & Meckling 1976 Analytical N/A Providing managers with an ownership interest in the firm helps 
offset the risk-taking incentives of "risky debt" financing, leading 
to lower levels of risk-taking as manager-ownership increases. 
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Author(s)/Year Methodology Industry Key Findings 
King & Wen 2011 Archival Cross-Sectional Corporate governance structure impacts risk-taking behavior. 
Strong bondholder governance leads to less risk taking while 
weak shareholder governance increases risk taking. Firm 
investment grade also impacts risk taking, with speculative firms 
increasing CAPX and reducing R&D when governance is strong 
and investment firms reducing CAPX when governance is strong. 
Board independence is associated with less risk taking, as are 
more stringent covenants associated with financing. 
Krishnan et al. 2005 Mixed Banking Issuing subordinated debt does not appear to induce more 
stringent external monitoring and, by extension, has no impact on 
bank risk taking. 
Lee 2002 Archival Banking The relationship between insider ownership and managerial risk-
taking depends on the firm's probability of failure (i.e. current 
risk position). The incentive effects of high levels of insider 
ownership are greater among firms with a lower probability of 
failure. 
Morck et al. 1988 Archival Cross-Sectional Insider ownership is related with managerial risk-taking, 
increasing risk-taking up through 5% managerial ownership then 
decreasing it between 5% and 25%, and finally increasing risk 
taking from above 25% managerial ownership concentration. 
Nguyen 2013 Archival Banking Subordinated debt can mitigate bank risk-taking provided that the 
level of regulation and economic development with the host 
country is sufficiently rigorous. 
Niu 2008 Analytical Banking Issuing subordinated debt leads banks to shift resources toward 
"safe" assets, thereby constraining risk-taking following the 
issuance of debt. 
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Author(s)/Year Methodology Industry Key Findings 
Saunders et al. 1990 Archival Banking Stockholder-controlled, as opposed to managerially controlled 
banks, engage in higher levels of risk-taking during a period of 
deregulation. 
Wright et al. 1996 Archival Cross-Sectional Institutional ownership is positively associated with firm risk 
taking for firms with growth opportunities. By contrast, high 
(low) managerial ownership appears to decrease (increase) risk-
taking in such firms. 
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Table 1.5: Corporate Governance and Monitoring Studies 
 
Author(s)/Year Methodology Industry Key Findings 
Berger et al. 2014 Archival Banking Younger top management teams are associated with 
greater risk taking in portfolios. Board changes which 
increase the proportion of female board members 
increases portfolio risk, while increasing the presence of 
academics (PhD holders) decreases portfolio risk. 
Chintrakarn et al. 2013 Archival Cross-
Sectional 
Managers who are entrenched in companies with 
staggered boards adopt less risky strategies as measured 
using stock volatility. 
Core et al. 1999 Archival Cross-
Sectional 
Poor corporate governance mechanisms reduces the 
ability of the board of directors to control executive pay, 
increasing agency problems and creating the potential 
for inappropriate levels of risk-taking compared with 
shareholder preferences.  
Cyert et al. 2002 Theoretical/Archival Cross-
Sectional 
Equity ownership of the board of directors and large 
outside shareholders constrain CEO option pay, thereby 
allowing the board to better control managerial 
compensation and risk-taking. 
Ellul & Yerramilli 2013 Archival Banking Stronger risk management functions within banks 
successfully curb risk-taking by bank executives. 
Ferreira and Laux 2007 Archival Cross-
Sectional 
Firms with stronger governance in the form of fewer 
antitakeover provisions exhibited higher levels of 
idiosyncratic risk.  
Jiraporn et al. 2015 Archival Cross-
Sectional 
Corporate governance, as measured using the ISS index 
(which contains information regarding board 
independence and other mechanism), is negatively 
related with firm risk-taking. 
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Author(s)/Year Methodology Industry Key Findings 
Pathan 2009 Archival Banking Strong boards which better represent shareholders 
interest are associated with more risk taking in banks 
while CEO power is negatively related to bank risk 
taking. 
Sun & Liu 2014 Archival Banking Banks with audit committees comprised of board 
members with long tenures have lower levels of risk 
taking. Busy directors on the audit committee are 
associated with higher levels of risk taking. 
Wang 2012 Archival Cross-
Sectional 
Companies with smaller boards have lower levels of 
leverage but more risky investments, suggesting that 
board size is negatively associated with risk taking. 
Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia 1998 Theoretical N/A The use of behavioral, rather than outcome-based, 
performance criteria by the Board of Directors reduces 
CEO risk-taking by forcing the CEO to undertake 
greater levels of compensation risk. 
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Table 1.6: Individual Differences Studies 
 
Author(s)/Year Methodology Industry Key Findings 
Byrnes et al. 1999 Experimental N/A Women take less risk, on average, than men in a variety of 
situations. This gap appears to be growing smaller over time, 
however. 
Chakraborty et al. 2007 Archival Cross-Sectional Termination risk is negatively associated with risk-taking. 
This effect overwhelms the risk-promoting effects of 
compensation convexity among CEOs facing termination 
related to investment failures. Delta is negatively related to 
risk-taking. 
Charness & Gneezy 2012 Experimental N/A Women persistently invest less, meaning they take fewer 
financial risks, than men across a sample of 15 experiments 
involving the same basic task. 
Delgado-Garcia et al. 2010 Archival Banking Negative affective traits are associated with lower levels of 
risk taking. Positive affective traits are not associated with 
risk taking. 
Dwyer et al. 2002 Archival N/A Women take less risk than men in mutual fund investment 
decisions, though this difference becomes weaker after 
controlling for investor knowledge. 
Forlani 2002 Experimental N/A Perceived outcome control impacts risk taking, with low 
outcome control associated with alternatives that have more 
extreme loss magnitudes and high outcome control associated 
with alternatives that have a higher probability of loss. 
Gneezy & Potters 1997 Experimental N/A Individuals exhibit myopic loss aversion. More frequent 
evaluation of returns lead to greater risk aversion.  
Hardies et al. 2013 Experimental N/A While socialization and self-selection can mitigate differences 
in overconfidence between men and women, they do not 
appear to fully attenuate differences in risk taking behavior 
between genders. 
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Author(s)/Year Methodology Industry Key Findings 
Kempf et al. 2009 Archival Mutual Funds Employment risk and compensation incentives both influence 
managerial risk taking.  Managers decrease risk taking 
following poor performance when employment risk is more 
important than compensation incentives, while risk taking 
increases when compensation incentives are more important 
than employment risk. 
Konrad & Lommerud 1993 Experimental N/A Status seeking increases risk taking for systematic risk but 
may increase or decrease risk taking for unsystematic risk 
depending on the shape of the individual's utility function. 
Lehman & Hahn 2013 Archival Football Momentum shapes perceptions of performance through the 
recency effect and other cognitive biases. Within-period 
momentum appears to weaken the risk-performance 
relationship when momentum valence aligns with 
performance valence.  
Li & Tang 2010 Archival Manufacturing CEO hubris is positively related to risk taking. Managerial 
discretion has a moderating influence on this relationship, 
increasing risk taking among high hubris CEOs. 
Loewenstein et al. 2001 Theoretical N/A The authors propose the "risk as feelings" hypothesis, 
highlighting the role of emotional reactions in risky decision 
making. While many models rely on the rationality of 
individuals in making economic decisions under risk, the 
authors suggest that emotional reactions may subsume 
rational, cognitive assessments of situations and lead to 
unpredictable outcomes. 
MacCrimmon & Wehrung 
1990 
Archival N/A Personal traits that are associated with risk taking include age, 
dependents, education, nationality, wealth and income, 
position, authority, seniority, firm size, and firm industry. 
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Author(s)/Year Methodology Industry Key Findings 
McNamara & Bromiley 1997 Archival Banking Better performing branches are more likely to overrate 
borrower's creditworthiness. Greater organizational 
standardization increases the likelihood of overrating 
borrowers while also increasing the probability the borrower 
receives an accurate risk rating. 
Menkhoff et al. 2006 Archival Investing Inexperienced fund managers appear to take more risk than 
more experienced managers. 
Mihet 2013 Archival N/A Low uncertainty aversion, low tolerance for hierarchal 
relationships, and high individualism are cultural traits which 
are associated with higher levels of risk taking in domestic 
firms. "Opacity" of information environment is also positively 
related to risk taking. Foreign firms take risk in line with their 
country of origin. 
Moreno et al. 2002 Experimental N/A Affective reactions can influence risk taking. Managers tend 
to prefer outcomes which elicited positive affect and avoid 
those which elicited negative affect even when doing so offer 
lower economic value. This can also lead to risk taking 
predictions which conflict with prospect theory. 
Naldi et al. 2007 Archival N/A Family firms take less risk than non-family firms, though risk 
taking is positively associated with proactiveness and 
innovation in family firms.  
Powell & Ansic 1997 Experimental N/A Women are less prone to taking risks than men. This effect 
appears to be unrelated to familiarity with a financial decision, 
framing effects, costs, or ambiguity in the description of the 
task. Men and women also select different strategies which 
lead to the differences in risk-taking but which do not impact 
the ability to make financial decisions (i.e. ability to perform). 
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Author(s)/Year Methodology Industry Key Findings 
Rottenstreich and Hsee 2001 Experimental N/A Individuals prefer affect-poor choices under conditions of 
certainty and affect-rich choices under conditions of 
uncertainty. This suggests that emotions influence decision 
making under conditions of risk. 
Sahm 2012 Archival N/A Age and macroeconomic condition influence risk tolerance, 
though risk tolerance appears to be relatively stable across 
individual lifespan. 
Seo et al. 2010 Experimental N/A Affect attenuates the relationship between prior performance 
and risk taking. 
Shiv et al. 2005 Experimental N/A Individuals with lesions in the area of their brain related to 
emotion made superior investment decisions compared to a 
control group with lesions in other areas of the brain and a 
second group of healthy individuals. The target group showed 
no signs of being influenced by affective biases or prior 
results. 
Shu et al. 2012 Archival N/A Low-Protestant and High-Catholic areas are associated with 
higher mutual fund return volatility for funds headquartered in 
the areas. Risk taking is in the form of higher portfolio 
concentrations, portfolio turnover, more aggressive trading, 
and more tournament risk-shifting behaviors.  
Sitkin & Weingart 1995 Experimental N/A Risk propensity and risk perception both moderate the 
relationship between outcome history and risk taking. 
Stenstrom & Saad 2011 Archival N/A High testosterone individuals are associated with greater risk 
taking behavior. 
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Chapter 2 
Declining Profitability and Manager’s Cost Management Decisions 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of declining firm performance on managers’ investment 
decisions. Investment decisions have significant implications for firm operating risk in 
that they represent expenditures of firm capital with uncertain future benefits. Behavioral 
theories predict that managers are likely to exhibit shifts in their risk preferences in 
response to declining performance. Analyzing cost data from a cross-sectional sample of 
firms from the years 1992 through 2014, I find that managers shift investments away 
from less risky capital expenditures toward more risky R&D expenditures following 
periods of declining performance. I also examine and find moderating effects of firm 
losses, corporate governance, and financial incentives on the relationship between 
declining performance and firm investment behavior. These results suggest that managers 
take on additional operating risk through their investment decisions following periods of 
declining performance.   
 
 
JEL: M41; L25; L60;  
 
Keywords: capital expenditures; research and development; behavioral theory of the firm; 
prospect theory; threat rigidity; performance. 
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2.1 Introduction 
This paper examines the impact of declining firm performance on managers’ risky 
investment decisions. Long-term investment decisions, including capital and research and 
development (R&D) expenditures, are among the most important strategic decisions 
made by firm management due to their impact on operating risk and future firm 
profitability. While capital expenditures in property, plant, and equipment are generally 
viewed as being less risky than R&D expenditures, outcomes for both types of 
investments are uncertain and unlikely to be realized fully in the short-term. Additionally, 
the sunk nature of such expenditures adds to their overall riskiness. Given its well-
documented influence on managers’ risk preferences and decision-making processes, 
firm performance is an important factor to consider in predicting managers’ investment 
decisions. 
The behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert and March 1963) is an organizational 
theory which predicts that firms react to declining firm performance through problemistic 
search (i.e. targeted, problem-directed search processes) focused on generating a variety 
of alternative solutions for improving performance. Theories related to managerial risk-
taking, however, provide conflicting predictions regarding managers’ risk preferences 
from among these alternatives once they have been assembled. Prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979) suggests that managers are less risk averse when faced 
with declining performance, leading them to focus their attention on the full range of 
potential outcomes associated with decision alternatives and to select riskier alternatives. 
The threat rigidity hypothesis (Staw et al. (1981), however, proposes that managers view 
declining performance as threatening and react with caution rather than risk seeking, 
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focusing on the downside risk associated with decision alternatives rather than the full 
range of outcomes. Empirical research has found evidence in support of both these 
predictions. Bowman (1982) and Bromiley (1991b) both provide evidence of increased 
risk-taking by firms following periods of declining performance. Audia and Greve 
(2006), by contrast, find that only large firms increase risk taking when performance fall 
below expectations, while small firms exhibit greater risk aversion when faced with 
below-expectations performance.  
This study examines the relationship between declining firm performance and 
managers’ investment decisions using financial statement data from a cross-sectional 
sample of U.S. firms from 1992 to 2014. I adapt a model of capital expenditures and 
overinvestment developed by Richardson (2005) in order to test my hypotheses. 
Employing both accounting and market-based measures of firm performance, I find that 
managers respond to declining firm performance by reducing their investment in non-
R&D capital expenditures. By contrast, I find an increase in R&D expenditures 
associated with declining firm performance. These results suggest an overall increase in 
risk-taking by managers when they face declining performance, with managers shifting 
investments away from less risky capital expenditures toward more risky R&D 
expenditures (Kothari, Laguerre, & Leone 2002). More generally, these results highlight 
differences in manager’s risk-taking preferences with respect to risky investment 
decisions depending on investment type. 
I also identify and examine three factors which, based on prior literature, are 
expected to moderate the relationship between firm performance and manager’s 
investment decisions: firm losses, corporate governance, and manager’s financial 
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incentives. While I hypothesize that firm losses and corporate governance mechanisms 
will limit the increased risk taking generally associated with problemistic search, 
financial incentives may induce greater risk-taking under the same circumstances. In 
cross-sectional analysis, I find that my findings on the relationship between declining 
performance and firm investment decisions are robust to the inclusion of each of these 
factors in my primary model. Additionally, I conduct subsample analyses and find 
evidence that firm losses strengthen the positive relationship between non-R&D capital 
expenditures and performance while weakening the negative relationship between R&D 
expenditures and performance, suggesting that firm losses reduces managerial risk-taking 
with respect to investment decisions. Additionally, I find limited evidence that financial 
incentives lead managers to higher levels of non-R&D capital expenditures in the face of 
declining performance (i.e. more risk-taking).  
While prior literature provides some limited insight into the relationship between 
performance and manager’s capital investment decisions, this study represents a unique 
contribution to the literature on this relationship. Eisner (1978) finds that capital 
expenditures are positively related to performance, a relationship he explains through 
managers’ use of current performance as a signal of the potential benefits to be derived in 
the future from capital investments. Bai, Hsu, and Krishnan (2014) examine the 
relationship between gross profit and capacity investments in a hospital setting and find 
that hospitals tend to invest in capacity for departments which have high gross 
profitability. These studies, however, consider performance levels rather than changes in 
performance. This distinction is important given theoretical evidence that managers’ 
assessments of performance relative to reference points can drive operating decisions 
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(Singh 1986). Audia and Greve (2006) find that firms, depending on size, exhibit either 
no change or reduced commitment to factory expansion in response to below-
expectations performance. Gaba and Joseph (2013) find that firms which fall short of 
profit expectations tend to introduce new products at higher rates compared to those that 
meet expectations. Similarly, Greve (2003) finds that declines in performance relative to 
benchmarks lead to higher levels of product innovation and increased research and 
development spending compared to other firms. These studies suggest that performance 
may influence manager’s investment decisions through higher levels of capital 
expenditures. These studies each make use of return on assets (ROA) as a measure of 
firm performance, ignoring other accounting and market-based measures (e.g. earnings 
per share and stock returns) which are more directly related to executive compensation. 
By simultaneously examining capital and R&D expenditures using both accounting and 
market-based measures of firm performance, this study provides new insight into the 
relationship between declining performance and manager’s investment decisions. 
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, this study informs 
the debate among organizational theorists as to whether below-expectations performance 
induces managerial risk-taking or risk aversion. In considering performance indicators 
previously ignored in prior literature, I draw attention to the potential sensitivity of results 
from prior literature to research design choices. Similarly, the differences in the 
performance-risk relationship between R&D and non-R&D capital expenditures highlight 
the importance of considering narrower classes of investments when modeling the 
relationship between prior performance and risky investment decisions. Additionally, I 
identify factors which influence the relationship between declining performance and 
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managers’ cost structure decisions. The finding that managers prefer to take on additional 
investment risk when financial incentives are strong provides additional support for calls 
from prior literature to carefully consider executive compensation packages and how 
their design influences firm risk-taking. Similarly, the noted moderating effect of firm 
losses on the performance-risk relationship provides support for the threat rigidity 
hypothesis noted in prior research.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II provides an 
overview of relevant literature and develops hypotheses related to my research questions. 
Section III includes a description of my sample, related descriptive statistics, and 
estimation models. Section IV presents and discusses my empirical results, after which 
Section V provides my concluding remarks. 
 
2.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Investment Type and Firm Risk 
 The decision to invest in capital expenditures and research and development 
presents significant risk to managers due to the uncertainty surrounding the future 
benefits of such investments. Kothari et al. (2002) note, however, that future earnings 
associated with each of these two types of investments are not equally uncertain. 
Compared to capital expenditures on property, plant, and equipment, they find that 
research and development provides significantly more uncertain future returns. This 
demonstrates the relative riskiness of decisions to invest in R&D compared to other types 
of capital expenditures.  
57 
 
 
Prior research has identified differences in preferences between capital 
expenditures and research and development spending which relate to managerial risk-
taking incentives. Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) find CEOs with higher levels of 
vega (or sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility) tend to invest more in R&D while 
investing proportionally less in property, plant, and equipment. Similarly, Choy, Lin, and 
Officer (2014) find that managers shift investments from capital expenditures to more 
risky R&D spending following a decrease in insider debt associated with freezing defined 
benefit plans. Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart (2012) similarly find that higher levels 
of inside debt holdings (such as pension benefits and deferred compensation liabilities) 
are negatively associated with R&D expenditures. These findings support the general 
contention that R&D spending is viewed by managers as being more risky than other 
types of capital expenditures.  
Behavioral Theory of the Firm 
 Managerial decision-making under conditions of risk or uncertainty is an area of 
management behavior which has received a significant attention in prior literature.2 
Organizational theorists have developed the behavioral theory of the firm (hereafter 
referred to as BTS) in an attempt to model decision making processes within firms, 
including how organizations assess operational outcomes and general firm performance 
(Mahoney 2005; March and Shapira 1987). BTS (Cyert and March 1963) posits that 
decision makers assess performance by comparing current profit levels to reference 
points. Two common types of reference points utilized by managers are historical and 
social reference points (Lim and McCann 2014). Historical reference points are typically 
                                               
2 See Larrick (1993) for a review of economic and cognitive models of decision making under conditions of 
risk and uncertainty.  
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developed by using prior own-firm outcomes in isolation. Managers will select a 
historical reference point for performance, for example, by comparing current-period 
performance to last period’s performance. By contrast, social reference points are 
developed using peers as a point of comparison (Audia and Greve 2006). This is 
analogous to managers comparing current performance levels to industry-level 
benchmarks. Managerial preferences for using historical or social reference points 
depend largely on environmental context and the perceived usefulness of each reference 
point (Audia and Greve 2006).3 The use of reference points in assessing current 
performance provides managers with critical information regarding the effectiveness of 
firm strategy and operating tactics (Gaba and Joseph 2013). 
 Performance gaps, or differences between current performance and historical or 
social performance levels, provide useful information for planning the operating activities 
of organizations (Audia and Greve, 2006). Given the strong connection between capital 
and R&D expenditures and firm performance, such gaps signal the need to make 
adjustments to the investment plans of the firm. Positive gaps, where current performance 
exceeds historical or social profit level, provide managers with affirmative signals 
regarding the effectiveness of current strategic and tactical plans. This leads firms to 
maintain current plans without significant changes rather than considering a wide range 
of potential alternative plans (March and Shapira 1987). Negative gaps, where current 
                                               
3 According to Lim and McCann (2014), “managers may prefer making social comparisons with their peers 
in the industry when they perceive similarities between their firm and others, but they prefer using their 
own-firm historical benchmark when they perceive their firm as different from others” (p. 277). It is 
unclear, a priori, to what extent managers in the manufacturing sector may perceive differences or 
similarities among firms in their industry. Research on intra-industry spillover effects of innovation and 
foreign direct investment within the manufacturing sector suggests the possibility that managers look to the 
practices of other firms when making operational adjustments (Fung 2005; Kugler 2006). As such, I 
consider both historical and social benchmarks in my main tests to account for this possibility.  
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performance falls short of reference points, provide a signal to management that there is 
some problem with their current plans. In contrast to positive gaps, negative gaps lead 
organizations to explore alternative courses of action which could be used to address the 
perceived problem of below expectations performance (Cyert and March 1963). 
Problemistic search, as this type of exploratory process if called, generally yields a much 
wider range of alternatives from which the organization can choose. Once managers 
engage in problemistic search and develop a set of alternative courses of action for the 
firm, their preferences for decisions alternatives is subject to individual risk preferences 
and cognitive bias (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Lim and McCann 2014).  
Firm Performance and Risk Preferences 
Performance gaps influence managers’ risk preferences depending on whether 
managers perceive these gaps as being within a loss or gain domain (Lim and McCann 
2014). Positive gaps are typically framed as gains by managers, while managers tend to 
frame negative gaps as losses. Prospect theory, a theory developed by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) to describe risk preferences in the presence of gain and loss framing, 
predicts that managers exhibit risk aversion when they adopt the gain framing associated 
with positive gaps. These preferences reflect situation-specific preferences to avoid risky 
actions which might disrupt current success (Cyert and March 1963; Wiseman and 
Gomez-Mejia 1998). By contrast, negative performance gaps and related loss framing 
lead to decreased risk aversion, or risk seeking behavior, as managers seek to eliminate 
the gap and improve performance (Cyert and March 1963; Miller and Chen 2004). 
Differences in how managers assess decision alternatives are related to the way in which 
they attend to the risk profile of alternative courses of action depending on their gain or 
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loss frame. Positive gaps, and related managerial risk aversion, prompts managers to 
focus on downside risk associated with decision alternatives rather than overall 
variability of outcomes (March and Shapira 1987; Miller and Leiblein 1996). Managers 
facing negative gaps, however, tend to consider the entire range of outcomes associated 
with each decision alternative (Bromiley 1991b). Adopting more risky strategies, such as 
undertaking relatively higher levels of R&D spending, follow from this more 
comprehensive decision alternative assessment as managers overweight the potential for 
realizing low probability, high return outcomes (Miller and Leiblein 1996; Bowman 
1982).  
 Other researchers, however, suggest that managers view negative performance 
gaps as a significant threat to the vital interests of both the firm and themselves (Staw et 
al. 1981). Negative gaps, according to this stream of literature, lead managers to fall back 
on traditional and familiar operating modes in an effort to avoid uncertainty (Milliken 
and Lant 1991). This concept, known as threat rigidity, posits that managers prefer to 
stick with current decision alternatives rather than selecting alternatives uncovered during 
problemistic search. Staw et al (1981) posit that threat rigidity stems from managers’ 
attempts to avoid uncertainty. Thus, managers who view negative performance gaps as 
threatening tend to focus on downside risk when evaluating alternative courses of action 
and reject alternatives which increase the organization’s downside risk. The threat 
rigidity hypothesis suggests that organizations facing negative performance gaps are 
likely to either adopt minimal operating changes or targeted changes which reduce 
operating risk. (Audia and Greve 2006).  
Hypothesis Development 
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Firm Performance and Manager’s Investment Decisions 
It is unclear a priori whether declining performance will lead managers to 
undertake higher or lower levels of investment risk. As previously discussed, capital and 
R&D investment decisions have significant implications for overall firm operating risk 
due to the outcome uncertainty surrounding such investments. As such, it represents a 
decision which may be influenced by managerial risk preferences. Whether managers 
respond to negative performance gaps with investment decisions which increase or 
decrease operating risk depends, in large part, on how they perceive such gaps. Prospect 
theory suggests that managers will respond to negative performance gaps by adopting a 
loss frame and assessing the overall variability of potential investment decisions. Loss 
framing predicts that managers will prefer riskier investment decisions, such as R&D 
investments, with higher upside potential. Threat rigidity, however, suggests that 
managers prefer to “stay the course” and avoid uncertainty and operating risk. To the 
extent that managers perceive negative performance gaps as threatening, they are likely 
to respond with either no significant changes in investment behavior or changes which 
result in reductions in overall investment risk. I therefore propose the following 
competing hypotheses: 
 H1a: Declining performance is associated with higher levels of risk-taking 
 H1b Declining performance is associated with lower levels of risk-taking 
Potential Moderators 
 Prior literature identifies several factors which are likely to increase the salience 
of negative performance gaps and investment-related earnings volatility in the decision-
making process of managers. Thus, these environmental factors are likely to influence the 
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relationship between declining performance and mangers’ cost structure decisions. The 
first of these factors is the presence of firm losses. Compared to managers in profitable 
firms with declining performance, managers in loss firms are more likely to view 
declining performance as a threat to the firm’s ongoing operations (Audia & Greve 
2003). The prospect of continued losses which could potential lead the firm closer to 
bankruptcy tends to focus the manager’s attention on downside risk, leading to a higher 
degree of risk aversion compared to managers of profitable firms (March & Shapira 
1987: Staw et al. 1981). Thus, I hypothesize that loss firms facing declining performance 
will exhibit less risk-taking compared to non-loss firms in a similar situation. 
H2: Loss firms facing declining performance will exhibit less risk-taking 
compared to non-loss firms facing declining performance. 
 
 A second factor which may influence the relationship between declining 
performance and manager’s investment decisions is the strength of the organization’s 
corporate governance mechanisms. King and Wen (2011) find that entrenched managers 
are associated with higher levels of R&D spending while strong bondholder governance 
is associated with less R&D spending and more capital expenditures. Additionally, Core, 
Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) find that weak corporate governance negatively impacts 
the ability of the board of directors to constrain managerial compensation, potentially 
leading to stronger risk-taking incentives, agency problems, and, potentially, and riskier 
investments. I hypothesize, therefore, that firms facing declining performance with 
stronger corporate governance are less likely to make risky investments compared to 
firms with weaker corporate governance facing declining performance.  
H3: Firms with stronger corporate governance facing declining performance will 
exhibit less risk-taking compared to non-loss firms facing declining performance 
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 Managers’ investment decisions may also be influenced by their financial 
incentives. Larcker (1983) finds evidence of a significant increase in capital expenditures 
in companies which adopt executive compensation plans with performance-based 
incentives. Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) show that executive stock options are positively 
related with risk-taking in the form of greater volatility of future earnings from oil and 
gas exploration among producers. Sanders and Hambrick (2007) document higher levels 
of spending on both capital expenditures and R&D spending among managers with 
higher levels of stock options, an indication of increased risk-taking among managers 
with appropriate financial incentives. Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn (2013), as well as 
Shen and Zhang (2013), similarly find less R&D spending among managers with lower 
levels of vega. I therefore hypothesize that firms where managers have high levels of 
financial incentives exhibit higher levels of risk-taking compared to firms with managers 
that have lower levels of financial incentives when their firms face declining 
performance.  
 
H4: Firms with managers that have higher levels of financial incentives facing 
declining performance exhibit more risk-taking compared to firms with managers 
that have lower levels of financial incentives facing declining performance 
 
 
3.3 Data and Methdology 
Sample Selection 
 I build my sample using data from the Compustat Annual Fundamentals file 
between 1992 and 2013. Following Richardson (2006), I exclude financial firms (SIC 
codes 6000 through 6999) from my analysis due to the lack of clear distinctions between 
operating, investing, and financing activities in such firms. I decompose total capital 
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expenditures into two separate categories: capital expenditures (including acquisitions) 
and research & development expenditures. Both categories have been used, separately 
and combined, in prior research as proxies for the long-term risk-taking behavior of firms 
given the return uncertainty involved with such investments (Audia & Greve 2003; Chen 
& Miller 2007; Lim & McCann 2014). All financial variables are deflated by total assets 
in order to control for the effects of inflation. Additionally, I discard firm-year 
observations with missing values for either current or lagged total market returns or 
earnings per share.4 In order to control for the potential effects of outlying observations 
on my statistical analysis and following Richardson (2007), I winsorize observations with 
capital expenditures (CAPEX and RDINT) in the highest and lowest 1% of the 
distribution. After deletions for missing variables, I am left with a final sample of 
121,977 firm-year observations across the entire sample period. Table 1 reports a 
description of the sample composition by industry. 
< Insert Table 2.1 About Here > 
 I also conduct subsample analyses utilizing three additional data sources. First, I 
gather data from the Execucomp database related to CEO compensation. This data is 
matched with stock return data from the CRSP databased in order to calculate the 
sensitivity of CEO wealth to changes in stock volatility (i.e. VEGA). This sub-sample 
contains 22,208 firm-year observations for the years 1992 through 2014 which could be 
matched to relevant Compustat data. I also obtain managerial entrenchment data from a 
publicly-available repository hosted by Harvard University.5 This database includes 
                                               
4 Estimation of the profitability variables used in this study require that firms have two years of lagged 
revenue and net income data. 
5 The EINDEX measure was developed by Professor Lucian A. Bebchuk and is hosted on his Harvard 
website at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml.  
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observations for the variable EINDEX and consists of 26,626 firm-year observations for 
the years 1992 through 2011 which could be matched to available Compustat data.  
Descriptive Statistics and Variable Definitions 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for variables used in the study. Descriptive 
statistics for variables measured in monetary units are reported in unadjusted dollars. The 
average (median) firm in my sample reported total assets of $3,214 ($1183) million, 
capital expenditures of $96 ($0.12) million, and research and development of $1.19 ($0) 
million.6   
< Insert Table 2.2 About Here > 
 I measure performance using both accounting and market-based measures. 
Chenhall (1997) describes profitability as a key performance concern within 
manufacturing firms, suggesting that organizational profitability is a useful target to 
consider when examining strategic decision making by managers. The first measure I use, 
therefore, is earnings per share (EPS), an accounting-based measure. I first measure the 
change in earnings per share between year t-2 and t-1 for each firm-year observation.7 I 
then rank each firm-year observation into deciles based on EPS changes and use that 
measure as a measure of absolute performance. Finally, I calculate industry-adjusted 
values of EPS changes and rank them into deciles based on those changes in order to 
construct a measure of relative accounting-based performance.   
                                               
6 Firms with missing values for capital and research and development expenditures are assumed to have 
had no such expenditures. Descriptive statistics for capital and R&D expenditures include entries of $0 for 
such firms.  
7 Following Lim and McCann (2014) I use the change between year t-2 and year t-1 rather than the change 
between year t-1 and year t in order to provide temporal precedence in the measurement of performance 
changes and subsequent reactions by the firm. 
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The second measure I use is total annual stock market returns, a market-based 
measure of performance. This measure may be more salient to managers given its direct 
relationship to the value of their firm-based equity holdings and stock options.  I calculate 
stock market returns for year t-1, which impounds changes in stock prices between year t-
2 and t-1. As with our first measure, I then rank each firm-year observation into deciles 
based on total stock market returns and use this as an absolute measure of market-based 
performance. Finally, I calculate industry-adjusted values of annual returns and rank 
them into deciles in order to construct a measure of relative market-based performance 
Model Specification 
The primary focus of this paper is the firm-level investment behavior of 
organizations following a period of declining performance. I therefore follow prior 
literature in specifying the following models of investment behavior:  
INVESTt = β0 + β1ΔEPSt-2.t-1+ β2RETt-2.t-1 + β3TobinQt-1 + β4LEVt-1 + β5Aget-1  
+ β6Sizet-1 + β7Casht-1 + β8CAPEXt-1 + Σγ1-19IndFE + Σψ1-23YrFE + ε  
 (1) 
 
The main terms of interest in Equation (1) are β1 and β2, both of which capture the 
relationship between declining performance and future investment decisions. Tobin’s Q 
is included as a measure of future growth opportunities as prior research notes the 
positive relationship between such opportunities and firm investment (Myers 1977, 
Richardson 2006). Lagged stock returns are also included as a way of accounting for the 
market’s perception of a firm’s growth opportunities (Lamont, 2000). By contrast, 
constraints on a firm’s ability to raise investment funds are increasing in the presence of 
higher levels of leverage or lower levels of cash (Bates 2005). Similarly, firm size and 
maturity (i.e. age) are likely to have an impact on its ability to raise capital for investment 
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(Richardson 2006). Finally, lagged investment is included to account for the so-called 
lagged investment effect, or the ability of prior investments to predict future investment 
behavior at the firm level (Eberly, Rebelo, & Vincent 2012).  
Equation (1) is separately specified for each of three investment-related dependent 
variables: CAPEX, RDINT, and I_NEWe. CAPEX is a measure of a firm’s investment in 
new non-R&D capital expenditures. Following Richardson (2006), new capital 
expenditures are calculated net of concurrent depreciation and amortization in order to 
account for investment required to maintain the assets which are already in place within a 
firm. CAPEX is calculated as follows: 
CAPEXt = CAPXt + AQCt - SPPEt - DPCt    (2) 
where CAPXt is equal to capital expenditures in year t, AQCt is equal to acquisitions in 
year t, SPPEt is equal to the sale of property, plants, and equipment in year t, DPCt is 
equal to depreciation and amortization expense in year t. All variables in Equation (2) are 
scaled by average assets. RDINT is a measure of a firm’s investment in research and 
development expenditures and is calculated as research and development expenditures 
(Compustat Item XRD) scaled by lagged sales. I_NEWe is an overinvestment in total 
capital expenditures and has been developed by Richardson (2006). First, capital 
expenditures, acquisitions, and research and development expenditures are summed. This 
sum is regressed on a series of control variables similar to those indicated in Equation (1) 
and the residuals calculated and saved. These residuals are then used as our variable 
I_NEWe and regressed on our predictor variables from Equation (1).  
 My interest in management’s investment decisions is as a proxy for their risk-
taking behavior given the uncertainty involves in estimating the potential future 
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performance of such investments. As such, I examine three factors which potentially 
influence the relationship between declining performance and manager’s risky 
investment decisions: losses, corporate governance, and management’s financial 
incentives. LOSS is an indicator variable which is equal to 1 if a firm realizes a net loss 
during year t-1 and 0 else. E_INDEX, the Entrenchment Index, is a corporate governance 
variable developed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). The six items which are 
included as part of this index are the presence of a staggered board, limits to amending 
the corporate charter, limits to amending the corporation’s bylaws, supermajority 
requirements for mergers and charter amendments, and the adoption of either golden 
parachute payments within executive compensation plans or shareholder rights plans (i.e. 
poison pills) by the firm’s Board of Directors. These items are summed, creating an index 
which can range from 0 to 6 for each firm-year. VEGA is a managerial incentive variable 
which measures the sensitivity of CEO wealth to changes in stock volatility (Guay 1999). 
I first examine the robustness of my results to inclusion of each of these factors. 
Table 5 provides estimates of the following three regressions, each of which includes one 
of the three factors of interest.  
INVESTt = β0 + β1ΔEPSt-2.t-1+ β2RETt-2.t-1 + β3TobinQt-1 + β4LEVt-1 + β5Aget-1  
+ β6Sizet-1 + β7Casht-1 + β8CAPEXt-1 + β9LOSSt-1 + Σγ1-19IndFE   (2)  
+ Σψ1-23YrFE + ε    
 
 
INVESTt = β0 + β1ΔEPSt-2.t-1+ β2RETt-2.t-1 + β3TobinQt-1 + β4LEVt-1 + β5Aget-1  
+ β6Sizet-1 + β7Casht-1 + β8CAPEXt-1 + β9EINDEXt-1 + Σγ1-19IndFE  (3)  
+ Σψ1-23YrFE + ε   
INVESTt = β0 + β1ΔEPSt-2.t-1+ β2RETt-2.t-1 + β3TobinQt-1 + β4LEVt-1 + β5Aget-1  
+ β6Sizet-1 + β7Casht-1 + β8CAPEXt-1 + β9VEGAt-1 + Σγ1-19IndFE   (4)  
+ Σψ1-23YrFE + ε   
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I then develop subsamples for each of these three factors in order to gain further insight 
into their impact on the relationship between declining performance and firm investment. 
For LOSS, firms are split into loss and non-loss subsamples for re-estimation of Equation 
(1). For EINDEX, firms are split into high and low governance subsamples for re-
estimation of Equation (1) using the sample median value for E_INDEX. For VEGA, 
firms are split into high and low managerial risk-taking incentive subsamples for re-
estimation of Equation (1) using the sample median value for VEGA. For each 
subsample, Equation (1) is simultaneously estimated for both subsamples and the 
coefficients on all coefficients are tested for statistically significant differences.   
 
2.4 Results 
Correlation Analysis 
 Table 3 reports correlations among the key variables of interest used in my 
multivariate tests. Spearman (Pearson) correlations are reported in the upper (lower) 
diagonal. I observe a statistically significant positive correlation between CAPEX and 
both ΔEPSt-2,t-1 and RETt-2,t-1, suggesting that firms adjust their non-R&D capital 
expenditures in line with their financial performance. By contrast, I observe a statistically 
significant negative correlation between RDINT and both ΔEPSt-2,t-1 and RETt-2,t-1. This 
negative correlation suggests that R&D expenditures behave differently from non-R&D 
expenditures by rising when performance declines. I also note statistically significant 
correlations between some, but not all, known predictors of investment and investment 
expenditures. AGE, SIZE, and LEV are all negatively related to CAPEX while only AGE 
and SIZE are negatively related to RDINT. CASH, as in prior research, is positively 
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related to both CAPEX and RDINT. TOBINQ, however, exhibits no statistically 
significant correlation with either CAPEX or RDINT. In untabulated correlation analysis, 
I identify a significant correlation between current and prior year investment (i.e. the 
lagged investment effect) as noted in prior research (Eberly et al. 2012) for both CAPEX 
(ρ = 0.975, p < .001) and, to a lesser extent, RD (ρ = 0.691, p < .001).  
<Insert Table 2.3 About Here> 
Regression Results 
Table 4 presents regression results for the primary analysis of the relationship 
between declining performance and manager’s investment decisions. Estimates of 
equation (1) using both historical and relative measures of performance are reported in 
Table 4 for each of the three investment categories: CAPEX, RDINT, and I_NEWe. 
Columns 1-3 report results using the historical measure while columns 4-6 report results 
using the relative measure of performance. These results show a notable difference in 
manager’s investment decisions with respect to general capital expenditures (CAPEX and 
I_NEWe) and research and development expenditures (RDINT). The coefficients on 
ΔEPSt-2,t-1 and RETt-2,t-1 are positive and significant for CAPEX and I_NEWe, suggesting 
that manager’s decrease general capital expenditures in the face of declining 
performance. These findings hold for both the historical and relative measures of 
performance. When Equation (1) is estimated for RDINT, however, the coefficient on 
ΔEPSt-2,t-1 becomes negative and significant as reported in columns 2 and 5 of Table 4. 
This suggests that managers increase their research and development expenditures as a 
proportion of sales following periods of declining performance. These results provide 
support for both H1a. Managers appear to shift their investments from less risky capital 
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expenditures toward more risky R&D expenditures, thereby increasing the overall 
investment risk-taking of the firm following periods of declining performance.8  
The control variables provide additional insight into the investment decisions of 
management in line with prior research. LEV is negatively related to general capital 
expenditures and no relationship with RDINT or overinvestment. AGE and SIZE are both 
negatively related with CAPEX and RDINT, suggesting that older and larger firms spend 
proportionally less on total capital expenditures. Firms with higher levels of cash on hand 
exhibit significantly higher levels of investment activity. Finally, I find evidence of a 
strong lagged investment effect as has been identified by other researchers.  
<Insert Table 2.4 About Here> 
 I next test the robustness of my results to the inclusion of several factors which 
are likely to moderate the relationship between declining performance and firm 
investment decisions. Table 5 reports estimations of Equations (2), (3), and (4) for each 
of the three investment variables previously specified. Results from this analysis provides 
further support for the risk-shifting behavior noted in the results from Table 4. I note a 
positive relationship between general capital expenditures and both performance 
variables. I also note a consistent negative relationship between R&D expenditures and 
RETt-2,t-1. Firms who experienced a loss in year t-1 invested less in general capital 
expenditures and more in R&D expenditures in the following year. Similarly, managers 
with high levels of VEGA exhibited lower levels of capital expenditures and higher levels 
                                               
8 In untabulated results, I test H1 using simultaneous equations involving specifications of Equation (1) 
with two pairs of dependent variables: first with RDINT and CAPEX and again with RDINT and I_NEWe. 
This is done to test my assertion that the behavior I observe actually constitutes risk-shifting. In both cases, 
the results of simultaneous equations exhibit the same pattern of significance for the relationships between 
ΔEPSt-2,t-1 and RETt-2,t-1 and the investment variables reported in Table 4.  
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of R&D expenditures. Finally, EINDEX was associated with higher levels of capital 
expenditures but not with lower levels of R&D expenditures. Across all regressions, my 
main results held with the individual inclusion of each of these variables.  
<Insert Table 2.5 About Here> 
I next address subsample analyses for the moderating influence of firm losses on 
the relationship between declining performance and managers’ investment decisions. 
Given the similarity in results between the historical and relative performance measures 
noted in Table 4 and the high correlations between the sets of measures (ρ = .954 for EPS 
and ρ = 0.947 for RET), results for all subsample analyses are reported using only the 
relative performance measures.9 First, the indicator variable LOSS is constructed for each 
firm-year observation to identify firms which experienced losses in year t-1. For each 
investment category, Equation (1) is then simultaneously estimated for the loss and non-
loss firms. Thereafter, the coefficients on ΔEPSt-2,t-1 and RETt-2,t-1 are tested for significant 
differences in magnitude.  
Overall, these results reveal a moderating influence of firm losses on the 
relationship between declining performance and managers’ investment decisions which is 
sensitive to the performance measure utilized. Across all three investment categories, I 
find that loss firms where stock returns have declined are associated with lower levels of 
risk-taking as exhibited by a stronger positive relationship between RETt-2,t-1 and all three 
investment categories. By contrast, loss firms where earnings per share decline do not 
exhibit any differences in their investment decisions. These results provide some support 
                                               
9 The reported patterns of significant are robust to the use of historical, rather than relative, performance 
variables. 
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for H2 and suggest that managers may possibly be more attuned to changes in firm stock 
price as compared to firm profitability.  
<Insert Table 2.6 About Here> 
 Table 7 presents the results of subsample analysis related to the impact of 
corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between declining performance 
and managers cost structure decisions. The variable EINDEX is calculated for each firm-
year observation and the sample is split into firms with below the median (i.e. high 
governance) and above the median (i.e. low governance) values for EINDEX. As with the 
results for firm losses, Equation (1) is simultaneously estimated for high and low 
governance firms by investment category using historical performance measures. Overall, 
results from these estimations provide only weak support for H3.  Statistical comparisons 
of the coefficients on the variables ΔEPSt-2,t-1 -2,t-1 reveal that low governance firms have a 
stronger positive relationship between declining performance and general capital 
expenditures compared to high governance firms. Results for RDINT, however, do not 
reveal any differences in the negative relationship between declining performance and 
R&D expenditures. No significant differences were noted for the stock return 
performance indicator (RETt-2,t-1), again highlighting the potential sensitivity of these 
results to the selected performance indicator. 
<Insert Table 2.7 About Here> 
Table 8, Panel A presents the results of subsample analysis related to the impact 
CEO financial incentives on the relationship between declining performance and 
managers’ investment decisions. The variable VEGA is then calculated for each firm-year 
observation and the sample is split into below the median (i.e. low incentive) and above 
74 
 
 
the median (i.e. high incentive) values for VEGA. Equation (1) is simultaneously 
estimated for the low and high incentive subsamples and presented with separate 
estimations for each investment category. The results reported in Table 8 reveal no 
significant moderating effect for managerial incentives on the relationship between 
declining performance and investment in general capital expenditures. While results for 
CAPEX and I_NEWe directionally show that higher levels of VEGA reduce the positive 
relationship between our performance and investment variables, suggesting higher levels 
of risk-taking in the presence of stronger managerial incentives, these differences are not 
statistically significant. Results for RDINT, however, indicate that higher levels of 
financial incentives lead to greater R&D expenditures following periods of declining 
profitability. I only note this relationship for the stock return performance variable, which 
is understandable given that the VEGA measure used as a proxy for financial incentives is 
sensitive to stock price. These results provide support for H4 and suggest that sufficiently 
strong incentives influence the relationship between declining performance and 
managers’ investment decisions. 
<Insert Table 2.8 About Here> 
Supplemental Analysis 
I evaluate the robustness of my primary results by using constructing the variables 
of interest using indicator variables rather than ranked changes as is reported in Tables 4 
through 7. These indicator variables are set to equal one if the firm experienced a decline 
in either total annual stock returns during year t-1 or a decline in earnings per share 
between year t-2 and t-1, and zero else. Results using these indicator variables exhibit a 
similar pattern of results as compared to those current reported.  
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I also make use of an alternative proxy for corporate governance strength in my 
subsample analysis in order to test the robustness of those results. The GINDEX, 
developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), accounts for 24 different corporate 
governance rules which encompass various aspects of firm governance. The incidence of 
these governance rules are summed, with higher values indicating weaker corporate 
governance and greater levels of managerial power. As with the results in Table 7 which 
make use of EINDEX as a corporate governance proxy, I split the sample into low and 
high governance subsamples using the median value of the GINDEX as the split point. 
Results using the GINDEX yield the same inferences as those reported in Table 7. 
As referenced earlier in the results section, I also calculated variable inflation 
factors (VIFs) for all regressions reported in Tables 4 through 7.  All variables used in 
reported regressions have VIF scores below 4 as suggested by Greene (2008). As such, I 
am confident that multicollinearity is not a significant problem in my analysis. Finally, I 
re-estimate my regression models using an alternative method of dealing with outlying 
observations to ensure that our results are robust. I truncate (rather than winsorize) 
observations with capital expenditures (CAPEX and RDINT) in the highest and lowest 
1% of the distribution. Results using this method of dealing with outlying observations 
yield the same inferences as the results reported in Tables 4 through 7. 
 
2.5 Conclusions 
This study examines the relationship between declining firm performance and 
managers’ investment decisions using financial statement data from a sample of U.S. 
manufacturing firms from 1992 to 2013. I adapt a model developed by Richardson (2005) 
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in order to test my hypotheses. Employing both accounting and market-based measures 
of firm performance, I find that managers respond to shifting their investments from less 
risky capital expenditures toward more risky R&D expenditures. I also identify and 
examine three factors which, based on prior literature, are expected to moderate the 
relationship between firm performance and manager’s investment decisions: firm losses, 
corporate governance, and manager’s financial incentives. I find evidence that firm losses 
strengthen the positive relationship between non-R&D capital expenditures and 
performance while weakening the negative relationship between R&D expenditures and 
performance, suggesting that firm losses reduces managerial risk-taking with respect to 
investment decisions. By contrast, I find evidence that financial incentives leads 
managers to higher levels of non-R&D capital expenditures in the face of declining 
performance (i.e. more risk-taking).  
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, this study informs 
the debate among organizational theorists as to whether below-expectations performance 
induces managerial risk-taking or risk aversion. In considering performance indicators 
previously ignored in prior literature, I draw attention to the potential sensitivity of results 
from prior literature to research design choices. Similarly, the differences in the 
performance-risk relationship between R&D and non-R&D capital expenditures 
highlights the importance of considering narrower classes of investments when modeling 
the relationship between prior performance and risky investment decisions. Additionally, 
I identify factors which influence the relationship between declining performance and 
managers’ cost structure decisions. The finding that managers prefer to take on additional 
investment risk when financial incentives are strong provides additional support for calls 
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from prior literature to carefully consider executive compensation packages and how 
their design influences firm risk-taking. Similarly, the noted moderating effect of firm 
losses on the performance-risk relationship provides support for the threat rigidity 
hypothesis noted in prior research.  
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Appendix A 
Variable Definitions 
 
CAPEX 
New Investment in Capital Expenditures (in millions) measured as: 
CAPEXt = CAPXt + AQCt - SPPEt - DPCt 
where CAPXt is equal to capital expenditures in year t, AQCt is equal to 
acquisitions in year t, SPPEt is equal to the sale of property, plants, and 
equipment in year t, DPCt is equal to depreciation and amortization expense 
in year t. 
I_NEWe 
Overinvestment in Total Capital Expenditures (in millions, deflated by total 
assets) measured as the residuals from a model of capital investment 
developed by Richardson (2007).  
RDINT 
Research and development expenses (in millions)  for year t divided by net 
sales (in millions) for year t-1 
ΔEPS Change in earnings per share (%) 
ΔEPSIA Industry-adjusted change in earnings per share (%) 
RET 
Total annual stock market returns measured as the change in the market 
value of the firm over the prior year (%) 
RETIA 
Industry-adjusted total annual stock market returns measured as the change 
in the market value of the firm over the prior year (%) 
TOBINQ 
Total market value of the firm for year t divided by the total book value of 
the firm for year t  
LEV 
Total debt (short and long-term) of the firm for year t divided by the sum of 
the total debt and total equity of the firm for year t 
AGE 
Log of the number of years the firm has been listed in Compustat at the start 
of year t 
SIZE Log of total assets (in millions)  
CASH 
Balance of cash and short-term investments deflated by total assets measured 
at the start of the year 
TA Total assets (in millions) 
SALES Net sales (in millions) 
LOSS 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm experienced a loss during the year 
and 0 else  
VEGA 
A measure of the sensitivity of CEO wealth to changes in stock return 
volatility calculated as 𝑣𝑒𝑔𝑎 =
𝜕𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝜕𝜎
∗ .01 
E_INDEX 
Entrenchment Index as defined by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) 
including a count measure of 6 entrenching measures which could 
potentially be adopted by the management of a firm. 
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Table 2.1 
Sample Composition by Industry 
 
2-
Digit 
SIC 
Codes 
Industry Name N 
% of 
Sample 
10-14 Mining Industries 9,863 8.09% 
15-17 Construction Industries 1,523 1.25% 
20-39 Manufacturing Industries 58,082 47.66% 
40-49 Transportation and Public Utility Industries 13,619 11.18% 
50-51 Wholesale Trade Industries 4,833 3.97% 
52-59 Retail Trade Industries 8,371 6.87% 
70-89 Services Industries 23,344 19.16% 
 Other Industries 2,229 1.83% 
    
Total  121,864 100.00% 
Table 1 presents the industry composition for the sample of firm-year observations used in 
this study. The sample consists of firms from all industries except the finance, insurance, and 
real estate indsutries (SIC Codes 60-67). Observations with values of I_NEW and RDINT in 
the highest and lowest 1% of the distribution are winsorized. 
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Table 2.2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
    Percentiles 
Variable n Mean Std. Dev. 25th 50th 75th 
CAPEXt 121,977 0.0379 0.1224 -0.0140 0.0139 0.0689 
RDINTt 121,977 0.0746 0.4259 0.0000 0.0000 0.0050 
ΔEPSt-2,t-1 121,977 4.4960 2.8439 2.0000 5.0000 7.0000 
RETt-2,t-1 121,977 4.5074 2.8471 2.0000 5.0000 7.0000 
TOBINQt 121,977 3.0150 90.8278 1.8307 2.3859 3.2445 
LEVt-1 121,977 0.3062 7.0477 0.0294 0.2749 0.5135 
AGEt 121,977 2.1388 0.6258 1.6094 2.1972 2.6391 
SIZEt 121,977 5.2483 2.5155 3.5226 5.2071 6.9515 
CASHt-1 121,977 0.1256 0.1593 0.0184 0.0646 0.1696 
TAt 121,977 $3,214.14 $16,343.32 $33.87 $182.56 $1,044.69 
SALESt 121,977 $2,531.02 $12,658.60 $28.59 $167.62 $919.96 
LOSSt-1 121,977 0.3760 0.4844 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
VEGAt 22,208 119.0819 270.0138 12.4571 41.5028 116.9763 
E_INDEXt 26,629 2.2322 1.3335 1.0000 2.0000 3.0000 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the sample used in the study. CAPEX equals a firm’s new capital 
investment for year t as defined in Appendix A. RD is the firm’s research and development expenditures (in 
millions) for year t. RDINT is a firm’s research and development intensity, measured as its R&D expenditures 
(Compustat Item XRD) scaled by lagged sales. ΔEPS is the change in earnings per share for a firm between year t 
and year t-1. RET is the total annual stock return for a firm during year t. TOBINQ is the total market value of the 
firm divided by the total book value of the firm for year t. LEV is the total debt (short and long-term) of the firm 
divided by the sum of the total debt and total equity of the firm for year t. AGE is the log of the number of years 
the firm has been listed in Compustat at the start of year t. SIZE is the log of total assets (in millions) at the start of 
year t. CASH is the balance of cash and short-term investments (in millions) deflated by total assets (in millions) 
measured at the start of year t. TA is the value of total assets (in millions) at the start of year t. SALES is net sales 
(in millions) for year t. LOSS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm experienced a loss during year t and 0 
else. VEGA is measure of CEO pay convexity which captures the sensitivity of CEO wealth to changes in stock 
price volatility in year t. E_INDEX is a firm’s Entrenchment Index value, ranging from 0 to 6, as defined by 
Bebchuck et al. (2009) for year t. Detailed variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
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Variable 
Name
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. CAPEX t 1 0.072* 0.094* 0.054* 0.162* -0.157* -0.052* -0.019 0.039* -0.256* -0.032* -0.002
2. RDINT t 0.352* 1 -0.009 -0.054* 0.269* -0.303* -0.333* -0.413* 0.314* 0.159* -0.097* 0.002
3. ΔEPS t-2,t-1 0.037* -.021* 1 0.345* 0.047* -0.018 0.022 0.031* 0.044* -0.329* 0.034* 0.056*
4. RET t-2.t-1 0.070* -.013* 0.295* 1 0.021 0.025* 0.035* 0.017 -0.016 -0.107* 0.025* 0.031*
5. TOBINQ t-1 0.007 0.001 0 0.005 1 -0.607* -0.186* -0.176* 0.457* -0.159* 0.129* -0.180*
6. LEV t-1 -0.026* -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.006 1 0.260* 0.375* -0.501* 0.098* 0.124* 0.167*
7. AGE t-1 -0.081* -0.113* 0.019*  0.055* -0.003 0.012* 1 0.459* -0.195* -0.144* 0.237* 0.111*
8. SIZE t -0.074* -0.157* 0.037*  0.077* -0.001 0.017* 0.343* 1 -0.212 -0.135* 0.577*  0.046*
9.  CASH t-1 0.231* 0.263* 0.021*  0.031* -0.006 -0.015* -0.161* -0.239 1  0.081* 0.041* -0.124*
10. LOSS t-1 -0.007 0.197* -0.269* -0.217* 0 0.001 -0.218* -0.389  0.205* 1 -0.091* 0.008
11. VEGA -0.045* -0.029* 0.032* -0.003 0.113* 0.020* 0.180* 0.470* -0.014 -0.090* 1 0.093* 
12. E_INDEX -0.001 -0.01 0.005 -0.013 -0.127* 0.027* 0.127* 0.041* -0.069* 0.014 -0.035 1
* indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent levels. Significance levels are two-tailed for all variables. Spearman 
correlations are reported above the diagonal and Pearson correlations are reported below the diagonal.
Table 2.3: Correlations Table
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Table 2.4: Declining Performance and Investment Decisions 
 Historical Social 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CAPEXt RDINTt I_NEWet CAPEXt RDINTt I_NEWet 
RETt-2,t-1 0.004*** -0.001 0.004*** - - - 
ΔEPS t-2,t-1 0.001*** -0.003*** 0.001*** - - - 
RETIA t-2,t-1 - - - 0.004*** -0.001 0.004*** 
ΔEPSIA t-2,t-1 - - - 0.001*** -0.002*** 0.001*** 
TOBINQt-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LEVt-1 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
AGEt-1 -0.011*** -0.032*** -0.000 -0.011*** -0.032*** -0.000 
SIZEt 0.004*** -0.016*** -0.001 0.004*** -0.016*** -0.000 
CASHt-1 0.143*** 0.546*** -0.008 0.143*** 0.546*** -0.008 
CAPEXt-1 0.038** 0.086*** 0.024 0.038** 0.086*** 0.024 
       
ΣIndustryFE included included included included included included 
ΣYearFE  included included included included included included 
n 121,912 121,912 121,912 121,912 121,912 121,912 
Adj. R2 0.1080 0.0182 0.1465 0.1074 0.0175 0.1465 
Table 4 presents estimation results for Equation (1). CAPEX is the firm’s investment in new capital 
expenditures for year t (Compustat variables CAPX and AQC summed together). RDINT is a firm’s 
research and development intensity, measured as its R&D expenditures (Compustat Item XRD) scaled by 
lagged sales. I_Newe is a measure of a firm’s overinvestment in total capital expenditures as defined by 
Richardson (2007).  RET is the total annual stock return for a firm during year t. ΔEPS is the change in 
earnings per share for a firm between year t and year t-1. TOBINQ is the total market value of the firm 
divided by the total book value of the firm for year t. LEV is the total debt (short and long-term) of the 
firm divided by the sum of the total debt and total equity of the firm for year t. AGE is the log of the 
number of years the firm has been listed in Compustat at the start of year t. SIZE is the log of total assets 
(in millions) at the start of year t. CASH is the balance of cash and short-term investments (in millions) 
deflated by total assets (in millions) measured at the start of year t. IndustryFE and YearFE refer to 
industry and year fixed effects, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by firm (Peterson 2009). *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. Detailed variable 
definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
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Table 2.6: Moderating Influence of Firm Losses 
          
 CAPEXt  RDINTt  I_NEWet  
 Loss Firms 
Non-Loss 
Firms 
Δ Loss Firms 
Non-Loss 
Firms 
Δ Loss Firms 
Non-Loss 
Firms 
Δ 
RETt-2,t-1 0.004*** 0.002*** ‡ 0.003*** 0.000 ‡ 0.004*** 0.002*** ‡ 
ΔEPS t-2,t-1 0.001** 0.000***  0.001 0.001***  0.001** 0.000***  
TOBINQt-1 0.000 0.003*** ‡ 0.000 0.001  0.000 0.003*** ‡ 
LEVt-1 -0.000 -0.001  -0.000 0.000  0.000 -0.001  
AGEt-1 -0.006*** -0.010***  -0.055*** 0.002** ‡ 0.005** 0.001  
SIZEt 0.003*** 0.002*** † -0.015*** -0.003*** ‡ -0.002*** -0.003*** † 
CASHt-1 0.191*** 0.071*** ‡ 0.758*** 0.064*** ‡ 0.040*** -0.080*** ‡ 
CAPEXt-1 0.029** 0.276*** ‡ 0.078** 0.071***  0.015 0.262*** ‡ 
          
ΣIndustryFE included included  included included  included included  
ΣYearFE  included included  included included  included included  
n 45,839 76,073  45,839 76,073  45,839 76,073  
Adj. R2 0.1321 0.1706  0.1900 0.0539  0.0277 0.1130  
Table 6 presents estimation results for Equation (1) for subsample analysis. Firms are divided into two subsets: 
ones which experienced a loss during year t-1 and those which did not experience such a loss. All other variables 
are defined in Table 4 and Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm (Peterson 2009). *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. *, †and ‡denote statistical significant 
differences between two coefficients at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. Detailed variable definitions are 
presented in Appendix A. 
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Table 2.7: Moderating Influence of Corporate Governance 
          
 CAPEXt  RDINTt  I_NEWet  
 
High 
Governance 
Low 
Governance 
Δ 
High 
Governance 
Low 
Governance 
Δ 
High 
Governance 
Low 
Governance 
Δ 
RETt-2,t-1 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
-0.001 -0.001* 
 
0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
ΔEPS t-2,t-1 
0.001*** 0.002*** 
‡ 
-0.000 0.000 
 
0.001*** 0.002*** 
‡ 
TOBINQt-1 0.003*** 0.007*** 
‡ 
0.001 0.003* 
 
0.003*** 0.007*** 
‡ 
LEVt-1 -0.001 -0.001 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
-0.000 -0.000 
 
AGEt-1 -0.003 -0.006 
 
-0.000 -0.010* 
 
0.007** 0.005 
 
SIZEt 0.001* 0.003*** ‡ -0.009*** -0.007***  -0.004*** -0.002*** ‡ 
CASHt-1 0.045*** 0.059*** 
 
0.051*** 0.060** 
 
-0.106*** -0.091*** 
 
CAPEXt-1 0.287*** 0.207*** 
‡ 
0.025 -0.004 
 
0.273*** 0.193*** 
‡ 
          
ΣIndustryFE included included  included included  included included  
ΣYearFE  included included  included included  included included  
n 15,276 11,350  15,276 11,350  15,276 11,350  
Adj. R2 0.1653 0.1454  0.0359 0.0411  0.1512 0.1040  
Table 7 presents estimation results for Equation (1) for subsample analysis. Firms are divided into subsets using 
the variable E_INDEX, a firm’s Entrenchment Index value, ranging from 0 to 6, as defined by Bebchuck et al. 
(2009) for year t. Firms are divided into two subsets: firms with values of E_INDEX at or below the median (high 
governance) and those with values of E_INDEX above the median (low governance). All other variables are 
defined in Table 4 and Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm (Peterson 2009). *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. *, †and ‡denote statistical significant differences 
between two coefficients at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. Detailed variable definitions are presented in 
Appendix A.  
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Table 2.8: Moderating Influence of CEO Incentives 
       
 CAPEXt  RDINTt  I_NEWet  
 Low Vega High Vega Δ Low Vega High Vega Δ Low Vega High Vega Δ 
RETt-2,t-1 0.001** 0.001** 
 
0.000 -0.002*** 
‡ 
0.001** 0.001** 
 
ΔEPS t-2,t-1 
0.002*** 0.001*** 
 
-0.000 0.000 
 
0.002*** 0.001*** 
 
TOBINQt-1 0.002*** 0.010*** ‡ 0.002*** 0.004  0.002*** 0.010*** ‡ 
LEVt-1 -0.002* -0.001 
 
-0.001 0.001 
 
-0.002* -0.001 
 
AGEt-1 -0.002 -0.013*** 
† 
0.025* 0.010 
 
0.008*** -0.002 
† 
SIZEt 0.002** 0.001*  -0.014*** -0.013***  -0.003*** -0.004***  
CASHt-1 0.066*** 0.054*** 
 
0.120* 0.087** 
 
-0.085*** -0.096*** 
 
CAPEXt-1 0.298*** 0.205*** ‡ 0.188 0.134**  0.284*** 0.191*** ‡ 
          
ΣIndustryFE included included  included included  included included  
ΣYearFE  included included  included included  included included  
n 11,069 11,136  11,069 11,136  11,069 11,136  
Adj. R2 0.1887 0.1159  0.0702 0.0481  0.1451 0.1031  
Table 8 presents estimation results for Equation (1) for subsample analysis. Firms are divided into subsets using 
the variable VEGA, a measure of CEO pay convexity which captures the sensitivity of CEO wealth to changes in 
stock price volatility for year t. Firms are divided into two subsets: ones with levels of VEGA below the sample 
median (Low Vega) and those with levels above the sample median (High Vega). All other variables are defined 
in Table 4 and Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm (Peterson 2009). *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. *, †and ‡denote statistical significant differences 
between two coefficients at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. Detailed variable definitions are presented in 
Appendix A. 
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Chapter 3 
Customer Concentration and Cost Structure10 
 
 
Abstract 
This study examines the effects of customer concentration levels on firm cost structure 
decisions. Analyzing cost data from a sample of manufacturing firms from 1976 through 
2013, we find a negative relationship between customer concentration and cost elasticity 
whereby firms exhibit lower proportions of variable-to-fixed costs in the presence of 
higher levels of customer concentration. Additionally, we find that greater customer 
bargaining power, proxied by supplier industry competition and product market fluidity, 
leads to lower cost elasticity as customer concentration becomes greater. These results 
are robust to alternate specifications as well as controlling for endogeneity using a two-
stage model. Our results suggest that suppliers respond to customer concentration by 
pursuing increased mutual dependence and cooperation with customers rather than 
attempting to reduce the effect of power imbalances within the supplier-customer 
relationship. 
 
JEL: M41; L25. 
Keywords: customer concentration; cost structure; cost elasticity; bargaining power. 
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3.1 Introduction 
This paper examines the impact of customer concentration on firm cost structure 
decisions, which are among the most important strategic decisions made by managers 
(Garrison, Noreen, and Brewer 2011). A firm’s cost structure, referred to as the relative 
proportions of fixed and variable costs, not only impacts firm operations but also its 
ability to realize profits from those operations. More rigid cost structures (i.e. cost 
structures that include a higher proportion of fixed costs to variable costs) generally lead 
to higher contribution margins relative to more flexible cost structures, thereby allowing 
firms to generate higher levels of profit when sales are strong. Cost structure can also be 
difficult to change in the short-run due to the illiquidity of committed resources. It is 
therefore not surprising that cost structure decisions incorporate a variety of operating 
and environmental factors. Despite the fact that both academics and practitioners have 
highlighted customer concentration as a critical environmental consideration for firms, 
prior literature has not considered the potential relationship between customer 
concentration and firm cost structure.  
Customer concentration and relationships with major customers have become an 
increasingly important area of interest for both researchers and practitioners as customer 
bases become more concentrated. Refinements to Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) resource 
dependence theory (RDT) identify two distinct dimensions of organizational 
interdependence which are informative in examining buyer-supplier relationships: (1) 
dependence asymmetry and (2) joint dependence (Gulati and Sytch 2007). Traditional 
views of customer concentration focus on dependence asymmetry, or differences in the 
level of dependence between suppliers and their major customers, and highlight 
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suppliers’ increased financial risk associated with the potential for customer defection 
(Scherer 1970).  More recent literature, however, examines the role of mutual 
dependence in promoting performance-improving economic bonding, information 
sharing, and cooperation between suppliers and buyers (Casciaro and Piskorski 2005). 
While suppliers may prefer to avoid relationship-specific fixed investments and adopt 
less rigid cost structures to minimize dependence and reduce dependence asymmetry, the 
need to meet the ongoing demands of major customers suggests they are likely to adopt 
more rigid cost structures (Snyder 1998). By adopting a more rigid cost structure and 
investing in relationship-specific fixed assets, suppliers can promote mutual dependence 
through increased customer switching costs and lower per-unit production costs (Garrison 
et al. 2011). While recent literature has examined the impact of other environmental 
factors on firm cost structure decisions, it remains an open empirical question as to how 
customer concentration influences cost structure decisions within firms. Given the 
increased prevalence of concentrated customer bases within the US manufacturing sector, 
it is important to understand the relationship between customer concentration and firm 
cost structure.  
We address this research question using data from a sample of U.S. 
manufacturing firms for the years 1976 through 2013. We specify a log-linear model and 
employ a measure of customer concentration, both used in prior literature, to examine the 
impact of customer concentration on firm cost structure. Our empirical results 
demonstrate a negative association between customer concentration and cost elasticity 
among suppliers within the manufacturing sector, with suppliers exhibiting a lower 
proportion of variable-to-fixed costs as their customer base becomes more concentrated.   
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We then examine how customer bargaining power influences the relationship 
between customer concentration and cost structure. Prior literature highlights the ability 
of large, powerful customers to exploit power imbalances to extract concessions from 
suppliers (Snyder 1998). RDT proposes that suppliers may use either adaptation or 
cooperation strategies to address power imbalances in supplier-customer relationships 
(Casciaro and Piskorski 2005). While the traditional view of managerial accounting 
typically promotes the use of adaptation strategies involving less rigid cost structure to 
reduce financial risk, this view does not consider cost pressures arising from customer 
preferences for lower per-unit prices (Gosman and Kohlbeck 2009). Therefore, we 
propose that suppliers are likely to choose cooperation strategies to deal with customer 
concentration. These strategies involve investing in relationship-specific fixed assets to 
build trust, promote information sharing, and minimize per-unit production costs (Joshi 
and Stump 1999). These investments also serve to increase customer switching costs and 
create barriers to entry for competing suppliers, which reduces the probability of 
customer defection (Dekker, Sakaguchi, and Kawai 2013).  
We find that customer bargaining power, measured using supplier industry 
competition and product market fluidity, strengthens the observed negative relationship 
between customer concentration and cost structure, leading to even lower levels of cost 
elasticity. We further supplement our main results with additional analysis in order to 
support the generalizability and robustness of our results. Our main results are robust to 
alternate specifications of customer concentration and the inclusion of controls for 
leverage and both employee and asset intensity. Our findings are also robust to the use of 
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a two-stage estimation procedure, where customer concentration is estimated in the first 
stage, to control for endogeneity related to the determinants of customer concentration. 
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, we identify 
customer concentration as a determinant of firm cost structure. Given the aforementioned 
difficulties in predicting the direction of the relationship between customer concentration 
and cost structure, our results represent an important contribution to our understanding of 
firm resource allocation decisions. The overall increase in customer concentration in the 
United States, coupled with cross-sectional variation in customer concentration across 
industries, makes our examination of this relationship both timely and important. 
Our study also contributes to the growing body of literature on the impact of 
customer concentration on firms’ strategic decisions. Prior literature has highlighted the 
advantages and disadvantages of customer concentration (Joskow 1987). While 
dependence asymmetries arise within concentrated customer bases due to the relatively 
large size of customers, customer concentration also presents opportunities for suppliers 
to develop strong customers into a source of sustained competitive advantage through 
fixed-cost investment and mutually beneficial cooperation. Such cooperation may allow 
suppliers to better leverage their investments in relationship-specific assets through 
improved operating efficiency and production planning. Our results support this intuition 
by demonstrating that firms adapt their cost structure in response to customer 
concentration by increasing their levels of committed resources, which reduce cost 
elasticity.  
Additionally, our findings contribute to a broader understanding of prior research 
on the impact of customer concentration on supplier firms. Dhaliwal, Judd, Serfling, 
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Shaikh (2014) find that customer concentration increases suppliers’ cost of equity, 
particularly for firms with a higher risk of customer defection. While Dhaliwal et al. 
(2014) attribute their findings to increased cash flow risk among firms facing higher 
levels of customer concentration, our results suggest that deliberate strategic decisions to 
maintain a larger proportion of fixed to variable costs may also help explain their results 
as prior research finds that higher levels of operating leverage are associated with higher 
cost of capital (Lev 1974; Mandelker and Rhee 1984).  
Finally, we provide insight into the potential mechanisms underlying the 
relationship between customer concentration and cost structure by identifying the impact 
of customer bargaining power on the relationship between customer concentration and 
firm cost structure. When customers have higher levels of bargaining power relative to 
suppliers, as they do in more competitive supplier industries, lower cost elasticity likely 
reflects higher levels of resource commitments to relationship-specific fixed assets made 
by suppliers seeking to compete for large customers and maintain current customer 
relationships (Snyder 1998). In both cases, the presence of major customers intensifies 
the effects of customer concentration on firm cost structure decisions. Considering 
environmental factors which influence supplier-customer relationships helps us to better 
understand how suppliers choose between reducing dependence asymmetry and building 
mutual dependence within such relationships. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II provides an overview of 
relevant literature and develops our hypotheses. Section III describes our empirical 
methodology while Section IV presents and discusses our results. Section V provides 
concluding remarks. 
93 
 
 
3.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Customer Concentration and Interdependence 
 Customer concentration refers to the number and relative size of customers that 
contribute to a firm’s revenues. As a higher proportion of overall revenues is contributed 
by a firm’s major (i.e. largest) customers, that firm is said to exhibit a higher level of 
customer concentration (Patatoukas 2012). The Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards (SFAS) 131 (FASB 1997) requires that firms disclose the presence of any and 
all customers who contribute 10% or more of enterprise-wide revenue, either to a single 
segment or across multiple segments. The FASB and SEC’s decision to mandate major 
customer disclosure reflects the potential for significant interdependence within supplier-
customer relationships and the financial risks which such interdependencies present for 
suppliers (Scherer 1970).   
Supplier-customer relationships are characterized by two main types of 
interdependence which influence the relationship: (1) dependence asymmetry and (2) 
mutual dependence (Gulati and Sytch 2007). Dependence asymmetry, in the context of 
bilateral trade relationships, refers to differences in how dependent each business partner 
is on the other. Suppliers are generally the more dependent party in a supplier-customer 
relationship as customers often have the option to unilaterally defect and select another 
supplier (Gulati and Sytch 2007). This dependence asymmetry results in suppliers being 
the more injured party in situations where customers, particularly large customers, choose 
to take their business to alternative suppliers. Mutual dependence, by contrast, refers to 
the overall level of dependence which exists between business partners. Suppliers who 
sell commodity-type products are less dependent on any one customer, ceteris parabis, 
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compared to suppliers who sell highly specialized machine parts or equipment because of 
the relative ease with which new customers can be recruited for commodity-type products 
(Raman and Shahrur 2008). Higher levels of mutual dependence, regardless of the level 
of dependence asymmetry within the relationship, make terminating the supplier-
customer relationship more expensive for both parties due to increased customer 
recruitment and switching costs (Winter and Szulanski 2001).  
Suppliers with higher levels of customer concentration face significant 
dependence asymmetry compared to firms with more diffuse customer bases due to the 
presence of larger and more important customers (Patatoukas 2012). Given that the 
defection of a large customer has a greater impact on firm profits than a smaller customer 
defection, financial risk is greater for suppliers with high customer concentration. Higher 
levels of customer concentration also signal the presence of larger customers who are 
more likely to attract multiple bids for their business, thereby increasing the potential 
financial benefits such customers may obtain through defection (Snyder 1998). This risk 
makes suppliers more dependent on their major customers than those customers are on 
them. 
Cost Structure 
 Managers make decisions about the relative proportion of variable-to-fixed costs 
based on a number of important considerations, including expected activity (i.e. demand) 
levels (Banker et al. 2014), general economic conditions (Gourio and Kashyap 2007), and 
other environmental factors that affect firm-level risk (Holzhacker, Krishnan, and 
Mahlendorf 2014). The traditional view of cost structure decisions is that firms take steps 
to offset increased operating and environmental risk by adopting higher proportions of 
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variable-to-fixed costs (Garrison et al. 2011). This view is grounded in the inherent 
riskiness of fixed costs, with more rigid cost structures (i.e. higher proportions of fixed 
costs) leading to greater reductions in profitability when sales decline. Thus, less rigid 
cost structures help managers offset risk by minimizing the potential downside risk 
associated with fluctuations in sales (Lev 1974). Kallapur and Eldenberg (2005) find 
evidence in support of these predictions, observing increased utilization of real options 
and preferences for more flexible cost structures in hospitals that faced changes in 
Medicare reimbursement rates. However, recent research by Banker et al. (2014), finds 
that firms prefer more rigid cost structures when faced with demand uncertainty. They 
develop a model which attributes the behavior to profit maximization, with firms seeking 
to capitalize on periods of unusually high demand. More generally, their study suggests 
that other types of firm-level risk may have similarly “counterintuitive” effects on firm 
cost structure decisions.  
Resource Dependence Theory (RDT)  
  Resource dependence theory (RDT) suggests two main strategies through which 
suppliers may deliberately address dependence asymmetry: (1) reducing dependence 
asymmetry and (2) increasing mutual dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Suppliers 
that choose to reduce dependence asymmetry focus their attention on maintaining flexible 
operations and avoiding relationship-specific investments in fixed assets (Galbraith and 
Stiles 1984). While suppliers may not be able to entirely avoid relationship-specific 
investments, they can make every effort to minimize the up-front fixed costs of such 
investments. For example, suppliers may choose to avoid investing in new equipment or 
plants by using real options in the form of outsourcing contracts or extra factory shifts. 
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These strategies allow suppliers to limit transaction risk associated with the supplier-
customer relationship.  
Alternatively, suppliers may choose to develop mutual dependence with their 
customers by using targeted investments and information sharing to deepen the supplier-
customer relationship. Relationship-specific investments in manufacturing equipment, 
process integration systems, and other fixed assets create switching costs for customers 
and promote sustained, mutually-beneficial relationships (Balakrishnan Linsmeier, and 
Venkatachalam 1996; Schloetzer 2012). These investments also help build trust between 
suppliers and their customers, which can improve forecasting, planning, and production 
efficiency (Matsumura and Schloetzer 2015). Therefore, adopting a mutual dependence 
strategy allows suppliers to better meet strong customers’ price demands while reducing 
the likelihood of defection (Gosman and Kohlbeck 2009).  
Hypothesis Development 
Customer Concentration and Cost Structure 
RDT and prior literature on cost structure present conflicting predictions as to 
whether suppliers will favor more or less elastic cost structures in the presence of 
customer concentration. To the extent that suppliers choose strategies designed to reduce 
dependence asymmetry, suppliers will prefer greater flexibility through higher 
proportions of variable costs within their cost structure (Kallapur and Eldenburg 2005). 
By contrast, suppliers choosing to increase mutual dependence are likely to exhibit lower 
levels of cost elasticity reflecting relationship-specific investments in fixed assets (Dou, 
Hope, and Thomas 2013).  
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In the context of supplier relationships with their major customers, reducing 
dependence asymmetry or increasing mutual dependence are not equally viable or 
effective strategies. Snyder (1998) finds evidence that large customers are able to use 
their market influence to demand lower prices from suppliers. Gosman and Kohlbeck 
(2009) find that these lower prices are often offset with higher purchase volumes and 
greater certainty surrounding receivables and inventory turnover. Choosing a greater 
proportion of fixed to variable costs allows suppliers to reduce per-unit production costs 
by spreading fixed cost investments over a greater number of production units (Garrison 
et al. 2011). Furthermore, RDT suggests that fixed cost investments also increase 
customer switching costs and create barriers to entry for potential competitors. Therefore 
we anticipate that suppliers facing significant customer concentration will adopt higher 
proportions of fixed costs to improve their cost competitiveness and deter major customer 
defection. Formally stated: 
 H1: Customer concentration is negatively associated with supplier cost elasticity. 
Impact of Customer Bargaining Power 
Prior literature highlights the impact of customer concentration on the relative 
bargaining power of suppliers and customers. Large, powerful customers have a 
significant bargaining power advantage which arises from the risk of customer defection 
(Casciaro and Piskorski 2005). Suppliers are often willing to give into the demands of 
their strong customers rather than face the negative consequences of losing their business 
entirely (Snyder 1998). Two strategies proposed by RDT for suppliers to address power 
imbalances are (1) adaptation and (2) cooperation. Adaptation strategies involve actions 
which minimize relationship-specific financial and transaction risk by adapting the firm’s 
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operating model to offset such risks (Galbraith and Stiles 1984). Cooperative strategies, 
by contrast, involve working with customers to develop a mutually beneficial relationship 
characterized by trust and collaboration. While adaptation strategies reduce financial risk 
and hedge against customer defection, such strategies impede the ability of suppliers to 
compete for the business of large customers who prefer lower per-unit prices. 
The decision to utilize adaptation or cooperation strategies impacts supplier cost 
structure. Adaptation strategies generally involve adopting less rigid cost structures with 
higher proportions of variable costs. Such strategies minimize the financial impact of 
customer defection and create operating flexibility for suppliers. Cooperative strategies, 
on the other hand, lead suppliers to make relationship-specific fixed asset investments in 
an effort to create interdependence and deepen the supplier-customer relationship. These 
types of investments help develop trust within the customer-supplier relationship, thereby 
promoting information sharing and mutually-beneficial cooperation (Kulp, Lee, and Ofek 
2004). Additionally, these investments create switching costs for customers and create 
barriers to entry for potential industry competitors, both of which decrease the probability 
of customer defection (Joskow 1987; Winter and Szulanski 2001). Cooperation strategies 
also support profit maximization in both the short and long term by allowing suppliers to 
compete for new customers and maintain price competitiveness within current customer 
relationships (Gosman, Kelly, Olsson, and Warfield 2004). Therefore, we anticipate that 
suppliers will respond to customer bargaining power differences through cooperation 
strategies which result in higher proportions of fixed costs. Formally stated: 
H2: As customer bargaining power increases, the association between customer 
concentration and supplier cost elasticity becomes more negative.  
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3.3 Data and Methodology 
Sample  
 We build our sample using major customer information reported in the Compustat 
Segment Files, which include data on customer name, type, and revenue contributed to 
the supplier firm.11 Following Banker et al. (2014), we restrict our sample to 
manufacturing firms (two digit SIC Codes 20 – 39). We also require that the supplier 
report at least one major customer.12 Our sample begins in 1976, which is the first year 
where major customer data is available and ends in 2013, which is the last year that data 
are available.  
 After compiling our sample of supplier firms with customer concentration data, 
we gather additional financial information related to suppliers’ operating costs and sales 
revenue (REV) from Compustat. Following Banker et al. (2014), we focus on three 
categories of costs: selling, general, and administrative costs (SGA), cost of goods sold 
(COGS), and the number of employees (EMP).13 Additionally, we gather information on 
a fourth category of costs: total operating costs (OC).14 We control for the potential 
impact of outliers on our analysis by truncating observations with values of Δln(Rev), 
Δln(OC), Δln(SGA), Δln(EMP), or Δln(COGS)  in the highest and lowest 0.5% of the 
                                               
11 Patatoukas (2012) examines the effect of customer concentration on the operating performance for all 
firms with available data in Compustat. However, since our interest is on cost structure, we follow Banker 
et al. (2014) in focusing our analysis on manufacturing firms.    
12 While SFAS 131 requires companies to disclose any and all customers who contribute ten percent or 
more of company-wide revenue, firms often choose to disclose customers who contribute less than ten 
percent of company-wide revenues based on the importance of such customers to the company (Patatoukas 
2012). Our analysis uses information about all disclosed major customers regardless of the percentage of 
revenue contributed by each customer. 
13 In the absence of a required financial statement category related to firm-level labor costs, we use the 
number of employees as a proxy for such costs. Our use of this proxy is consistent with prior research 
(Banker et al. 2014).   
14 We follow Kama and Weiss (2012) in using operating costs (OC), defined as revenue minus operating 
income, as a summary measure of total firm costs. 
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distribution. We are left with a final sample of 46,836 firm-year observations across the 
entire sample period. Table 1 reports a description of the sample composition by industry. 
Observations from firms in the electronic equipment and components industry, 
industrial/commercial machinery and computer equipment industry, and chemicals and 
allied products industry make up slightly more than 50% of the sample.  
< Insert Table 3.1 About Here > 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for variables used in the study. Differences 
in numbers of observations across variables are attributable to missing data. While we 
exclude observations which are missing total operating cost data, we do not exclude 
observations missing any of the three sub-categories of operating costs (SGA, COGS, or 
EMP). Our descriptive statistics measured in monetary units are reported in CPI adjusted 
dollars deflated using 1982-1984 as the base year. The average (median) firm in our 
sample reported sales revenue of $753 ($51) million dollars and total operating costs of 
$675 ($50) million.   
< Insert Table 3.2 About Here > 
We construct our customer concentration variable (CC) by adopting the measure 
developed by Patatoukas (2012). This measure allows us to capture both the total number 
of major customers present within a firm’s customer base and their relative importance 
within the firm’s revenue stream. The resulting measure of firm i’s customer 
concentration in year t, essentially a weighted-average index of customer-specific 
revenue to total firm revenue, is described by the following equation: 
  𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 = ∑ (
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
)
2
𝐽
𝑗=                    (1) 
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where Salesijt represents firm i’s sales to customer j in year t and Salesit represents total 
sales for firm i in year t. Average (median) CC is 0.1333 (0.0622) for our sample of 
firms. In untabulated tests, we also conduct our analysis using an indicator variable for 
the presence of customers who contribute 10% or more of a firm’s revenues as an 
alternate measure of customer concentration. This threshold has been used in prior 
literature as a proxy for customer concentration (Bae and Wang 2010; Gosman and 
Kohlbeck 2009; Gosman, Kelly, Ollson, and Warfield 2004). 74.84% of firms in our 
sample report at least one customer who contributes 10% or more of overall firm 
revenues.  
Model Specification 
Following the methodology proposed in prior research (Kallapur and Eldenburg 
2005; Banker et al. 2014), we examine our research questions using a log-linear cost 
model where log- changes in costs are regressed on concurrent log-changes in sales 
revenues plus controls:  
Δln(Cost) = β0 +  β1Δln(Rev)  +  β2RankCC * Δln(Rev)  
+  β3GDPGrowth * Δln(Rev)  + β4Size * Δln(Rev)  +  β5RankCC    (2) 
+  β6GDPGrowth + β7Size + Σγ1-19IndFE + Σψ1-19IndFE * Δln(Rev) +  ε  
                     
where the term Δln(Cost) is the log-change in costs for a firm from year t-1 to year t. We 
estimate equation (2) using four separate specifications of the Δln(Cost) term: total 
operating costs (OC), selling, general, and administrative costs (SGA), number of 
employees (EMP), and cost of goods sold (COGS). The term Δln(Rev) is specified as the 
log-change in revenue for a firm between year t-1 and year t. RankCC is defined as the 
decile rank of a firm for year t. We construct the variable RankCC by first calculating the 
value for CC as described in equation (1) for each firm-year observation. We then rank 
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each firm-year observation into deciles based on their CC score and scale the decile rank 
so that the measure takes a value between 0 and 1. GDPGrowth refers to the log-change 
in Gross Domestic Product from year t-1 to year t. Size is defined as the natural log of 
sales for a firm in year t. We include GDPGrowth and Size as well as interactions with 
each variable and Δln(Rev) as controls. Our model also includes controls for industry 
fixed effects (IndFE) and interactions between our industry indicators and log-changes in 
revenue (IndFE * Δln(Rev)).   
The slope coefficient β1 in this regression equation provides an estimate of the 
percentage change in costs associated with a one percent change in sales revenue. A 
smaller slope indicates a lower proportion of variable costs and a higher proportion of 
fixed costs (Banker et al. 2014). To capture the effect of customer concentration on cost 
elasticity, we include the interaction term RankCC*Δln(Rev). A negative sign on the 
coefficient of β2 for this interaction term would indicate that higher customer 
concentration leads to lower cost elasticity (i.e. greater fixed costs), while a positive sign 
would indicate that higher customer concentration leads to higher cost elasticity (i.e. 
greater variable costs).  
 We use two proxies for customer bargaining power: supplier industry competition 
and product market fluidity.15 When supplier market competition is high, customers have 
greater bargaining power relative to suppliers (Porter 2008). As a result, suppliers are 
more likely to have to fend off competing bids for the business of their major customers 
(Brown, Fee, and Thomas 2009). We use each firm’s three digit SIC Herfindahl-
                                               
15 Prior studies have adopted the relative size of the supplier and buyer as a proxy for customer bargaining 
power (Brown et al. 2009). Given that our customer concentration proxy includes information about all of a 
firm’s customers, it is infeasible to adopt this more common proxy of customer bargaining power. Thus, we 
adopt supplier market competition and product market fluidity as alternate proxies in our analysis. 
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Hirschman Index (HHI) in year as a proxy for supplier industry competition. Product 
market fluidity has also been shown to influence customer bargaining power through the 
level of competitive threats and potential new market entrants facing a firm (Hoberg, 
Phillips, and Prabhala 2014). We adopt a text-based measure of product market fluidity 
developed by Hoberg et al. (2014) which captures changes in the rivals’ products relative 
to a firm’s own products. The measure is calculated using the following formula: 
𝐹𝑙𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖 = (𝑁𝑖,𝑡 ∙
𝐷𝑡−1,𝑡
‖𝐷𝑡−1,𝑡‖
)    (3) 
where Ni,t is a vector of zeroes and ones indicating whether a unique product-related 
word is used by firm i in year t, and Dt-1,t  is the aggregate change vector capturing overall 
changes in word usage between year t-1 and year t. The Fluid value for each firm is 
calculated as the dot product of these two vectors.16 Higher values of Fluid indicate 
greater potential for new market entrants and competitive threats. 
To capture the effect of customer bargaining power on the relationship between 
customer concentration and cost elasticity, we include the three-way interaction of our 
measures of customer bargaining power, customer concentration, and the log-change in 
revenue. This leads to the following regression specifications: 
Δln(Cost) = β0 +  β1Δln(Rev)  +  β2RankCC * Δln(Rev)  
     +  β3HighPowerHHI * Δln(Rev)  +  β4HighPowerHHI * RankCC * Δln(Rev)   
     +  β5GDPGrowth * Δln(Rev)  +  β6Size* Δln(Rev)  +  β7RankCC                  (4a) 
     +  β8HighPowerHHI  +  β9GDPGrowth + β10Size  +  Σγ1-19IndFE   
     +  Σψ1-19IndFE * Δln(Rev)  +  ε  
 
Δln(Cost) = β0 +  β1Δln(Rev)  +  β2RankCC * Δln(Rev)  
     +  β3HighPowerFluid * Δln(Rev)  +  β4HighPowerFluid * RankCC * Δln(Rev)   
     +  β5GDPGrowth * Δln(Rev)  +  β6Size* Δln(Rev)  +  β7RankCC                 (4b)  
     +  β8HighPowerFluid  +  β9GDPGrowth + β10Size  +  Σγ1-19IndFE   
                                               
16 For more detail on the calculation of the Fluidity scores see Hoberg et al. (2014). Fluidity scores are 
downloaded from Gordon Phillip’s website at http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/industrydata/. We thank 
Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala for allowing access to their data.  
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     +  Σψ1-19IndFE * Δln(Rev)  +  ε 
 
where the term HighPower indicates the presence of high levels of supplier industry 
competition. The HighPowerHHI (HighPowerFluid) variable in equation (4a) (equation 
(4b)) is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s HHI (Fluid) score is higher than 
the sample median and zero otherwise. Additionally, we test the robustness of our 
customer bargaining power measures by replacing our two HighPower variables with 
alternative decile-ranked variables. RankPowerHHI (RankPowerFluid) is set equal to the 
firm’s decile-ranked HHI (Fluid) value scaled to range from zero to one. All other 
variable definitions are the same as those described earlier for equation (2). We 
summarize our variable definitions in Appendix A.  
 
3.4 Empirical Results 
Correlation Analysis 
 Table 3 reports correlations among the variables used in our multivariate tests. 
Spearman (Pearson) correlations are reported in the upper (lower) diagonal. As expected, 
all costs are highly positively correlated with revenue, which indicates that revenue is an 
appropriate cost driver in our setting. We also observe a negative and statistically 
significant correlation between firm size (Size) and both CC (ρ = -.167, p < .01) and 
RankCC (ρ = -.164, p < .01), which is consistent with the intuition that smaller firms have 
more concentrated customer bases.17  
< Insert Table 3.3 About Here > 
                                               
17 As discussed in our additional analysis section, our results are unchanged when removing suppliers with 
less than $10 million in assets from our sample. 
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Regression Results 
 Table 4 presents the regression results of our primary analysis of the effect of 
customer concentration on cost structure. Estimates of equation (2) for each of the four 
cost categories, operating costs (OC), SG&A costs (SGA), number of employees (EMP) 
and cost of goods sold (COGS) are shown in Columns 1-4, respectively. As expected, the 
coefficient β1 for Δln(Rev) is positive and significant in the estimates of all four cost 
categories. The coefficient for the variable of interest, which is the interaction of the 
customer concentration measure with changes in revenue (RankCC * Δln(Rev)), is β2. 
The β2 coefficient is negative and significant in all four specifications, indicating that 
firms with greater customer concentration have less elastic costs structures. Interpreting 
the magnitude of the coefficients β1 and β2 in Column 1, a one percent increase in 
revenue increases operating costs by approximately 0.51 percent, on average, for firms in 
the lowest decile of customer concentration, but only increases operating costs by about 
0.37 (= 0.51 – 0.14) percent, on average, for firms in the highest decile of customer 
concentration. The results presented in Table 4 are consistent with the prediction of H1 
and suggest that firms with more concentrated customer bases choose greater proportions 
of fixed costs compared to variable costs. Examining our control variables, we also find 
positive and statistically significant coefficients on  GDPGrowth * Δln(Rev) and Size * 
Δln(Rev), suggesting that changes in costs are more sensitive to changes in sales when the 
economy is growing and that larger firms have more elastic cost structures.18 
< Insert Table 3.4 About Here > 
                                               
18 The positive coefficient on GDPGrowth * Δln(Rev) is consistent with the findings documented in Banker 
et al. (2014). The effect of size on cost structure is unclear as firms can achieve greater sales by using any 
mix of fixed to variable cost investments. As documented later in this paper, firms with greater asset 
intensity have more rigid cost structures. 
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We next examine the effects of customer bargaining power on the relationship 
between customer concentration and cost structure. The regression results for our 
estimates of equation (4a) are presented in Table 5.19 The coefficient on the three-way 
interaction terms HighPowerHHI * RankCC * Δln(Rev) and HighPowerFluid * RankCC * 
Δln(Rev) capture the incremental effect of customer bargaining power on the relationship 
between customer concentration and cost structure. Additionally, we include the 
interaction terms HighPowerHHI * Δln(Rev) and HighPowerFluid * Δln(Rev) to capture the 
main effect of customer bargaining power on cost structure. As seen in Column 1 of 
Table 5, the coefficients on HighPowerHHI * RankCC * Δln(Rev) and HighPowerHHI * 
Δln(Rev) are both negative and statistically significant. Similarly, Column 2 of Table 5 
provides estimates for equation (4b) and shows that the coefficients on HighPowerFluid * 
RankCC * Δln(Rev) and HighPowerFluid * Δln(Rev) are both negative and statistically 
significant. These results provide support for H2 and suggest that higher customer 
concentration is associated with even greater cost rigidity when suppliers have lower 
relative bargain power. The estimates from Column 1 indicate that, on average, a one 
percent increase in revenue increases operating costs by 0.42 (= 0.51 - 0.09) percent for 
firms with high customer concentration compared to an increase of 0.30 (= 0.51 - 0.09 - 
0.06 - 0.06) percent for high customer concentration firms operating under high customer 
bargaining power as measured using the firm’s HHI.  
As a robustness check, we also re-estimate equations (4a) and (4b) using decile-
ranked HHI (RankPowerHHI) and decile-ranked product market fluidity score 
                                               
19 For brevity, we present only estimates for operating costs in Table 5. Estimates for the other three cost 
categories lead to the same interpretation. Additionally, operating costs include all of the other three cost 
categories (SGA, COGS and employee costs). 
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(RankPowerFluid), in place of HighPowerHHI  and HighPowerFluid. The results of 
estimating equations (4a and 4b) using these alternative proxies for customer bargaining 
power are reported in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5,  and the interpretation of these results 
are consistent with those from analyzing Columns 1 and 2. 
< Insert Table 3.5 About Here > 
Additional Analysis and Robustness Checks 
 To evaluate the robustness of our primary results, we perform the following 
additional analyses. First, we include a control for the effect of leverage on firm cost 
structure decisions. Prior studies have shown that customer concentration is also related 
to capital structure decisions. Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim (2008) provide evidence that 
firms with major customers tend to hold less debt, though Hennessy and Livdan (2009) 
find that firms increase debt in response to increases in the bargaining power of their 
business partners. Higher levels of leverage can potentially affect cost structure by 
increasing the risk of bankruptcy, which may incentivize managers to choose more elastic 
cost structures (Novy-Mark 2011). However, many firms will use debt financing to pay 
for fixed assets and relationship-specific investments, both of which would decrease cost 
elasticity. We control for the effect of leverage using the indicator variable HighDebt. We 
construct the variable HighDebt by first calculating the debt-to-equity ratio for each firm-
year observation. We then set HighDebt equal to one for firm-year observations which 
are above the sample median for debt-to-equity ratio and zero otherwise.  
Table 6 presents results after controlling for leverage. In Column 1, we present 
estimates for a re-specification of equation (2) which includes an additional interaction 
between the HighDebt variable and log change in revenue (HighDebt * Δln(Rev)). 
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Columns 2 and 3 present subsample analysis results for equation (2) with the full sample 
split between high and low debt firms, respectively. The coefficient on the term RankCC 
* Δln(Rev) remains negative and statistically significant across all three specifications, 
providing evidence that our results are not simply being driven by firms’ capital structure 
decisions. The difference between the coefficient on RankCC * Δln(Rev) in Columns 2 
and 3 are not statistically significant, suggesting that the effects of customer 
concentration on firm cost structure is similar across low and high debt firms. 
Additionally the coefficient on HighDebt * Δln(Rev) is positive and significant at the 
10% level which indicates that firms may chose more elastic cost structures to guard 
against bankruptcy risk.20    
< Insert Table 3.6 About Here >  
 Next, we control for the impact of asset intensity (ASINT) and employee intensity 
(EMPINT), both important determinants of cost behavior in firms (Banker, Byzalov, 
Ciftci and Mashruwala 2014b).21 ASINT is calculated for each firm-year observation as 
gross property, plant, and equipment (PPE) divided by sales. EMPINT is calculated for 
each firm-year observation as the number of employees (EMP) divided by sales. The 
results of these regression estimates are presented in Table 7. Unsurprisingly, greater 
asset intensity results in lower cost elasticity while greater employee intensity results in 
greater cost elasticity. More importantly, the coefficient on the interaction of RankCC and 
                                               
20 In untabulated results, we used an alternative specification of our leverage variable. Specifically, we 
replaced our median-split indicator variable with a decile-ranked variable scaled from 0 to 1 for debt-to-
equity ratio. Our results remain qualitatively unchanged when using this alternative measure. 
21 We intentionally excluded such controls from our primary tests because customer concentration likely 
affects cost elasticity through managers’ choice of the mix of fixed assets and employees used in 
production. Therefore, including controls that are measures of these decisions may unnecessarily bias us 
against finding the relationship between customer concentration and cost structure.  
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change in revenue (RankCC * Δln(Rev)) remains negative and statistically significant 
after controlling for asset and employee intensity. 
< Insert Table 3.7 About Here > 
To address concerns about spurious correlations, we use a two-stage approach 
similar to the one used in Patatoukas (2012). In the first stage, we estimate the residuals 
from annual cross-sectional regressions of the changes in CC (∆CC) on a vector of 
variables as follows: 
∆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑡 ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑡 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑘 +  𝑒𝐾𝑘=1           (5) 
where ∆CC is the changes of CC and X is the vector of variables in the first stage 
including: 1) market capitalization, 2) firm age, 3) annual percentage sales growth, 4) 
number of reported business segments, and 5) change in the HHI for each firm-year 
observation. In the second stage, we estimate equation (2) using ranked residuals 
(RankCCResid) from equation (5) instead of the observed RankCC.22 
 Table 8 presents the results of the second stage regressions. Column 1 shows 
regression estimates using all observations with available data from the full sample. The 
coefficient on the interaction term RankCCResid * Δln(Rev) is positive and not 
significant. This is likely due to the fact that investments in fixed costs are difficult to 
reverse in the short run. As a result, increases in fixed cost relative to variable costs are 
likely to be present in firms with increasing customer concentration. Column 2 presents 
regression estimates using only the sample of firms with change in CC greater than or 
                                               
22 Patatoukas (2012) focuses on changes in CC rather than levels of CC. However, our results are also 
robust to using levels of customer concentration in the first stage. 
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equal to zero. Consistent with the rest of our findings, the coefficient on the interaction 
term RankCCResid * Δln(Rev) is negative and statistically significant.     
< Insert Table 3.8 About Here > 
 Additionally, we present several subsample analyses in Table 9 in order to 
demonstrate the generalizability of our results. Specifically, we re-estimate equation (2) 
for four subsamples of our full sample. Since the cutoff for mandatory disclosure of a 
major customer is 10 percent of total sales, we exclude firms that do not report at least 
one customer with sales equal to or greater than 10 percent of its total sales in Column 1. 
In Column 2, we exclude all firms that cannot be linked to another publicly traded firm in 
Compustat because many studies use these links when examining supply chain 
relationships. In Column 3, we exclude firms with less than $10 million in assets because 
customer concentration is negatively associated with firm size. In Column 4, we examine 
the subsample of observations after the passage of SFAS 131 in 1997. The coefficient on 
RankCC * Δln(Rev) is negative and statistically significant across all four subsamples. In 
untabulated results, we use alternative measures for customer concentration. Specifically, 
we replace our main customer concentration variable with either the raw CC score from 
Patatoukas (2012) or an indicator variable for whether the firm has at least one customer 
which accounts for more than 10 percent of its sales as alternative measures of customer 
concentration. Our results are qualitatively unchanged when using these alternative 
measures.  
< Insert Table 3.9 About Here > 
 In additional untabulated results, we control for the previously identified effect of 
demand uncertainty on firm cost structure. Customer concentration may also increase 
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demand uncertainty since the reliance on a small number of major customers can result in 
large swings in demand if one customer withdraws their business. We control for the 
effect of demand uncertainty using the proxy proposed by Banker et al. (2014), which is 
calculated as the standard deviation of log changes in sales using all observations for a 
given firm (UNCERT). We then interact this demand uncertainty measure with log-
changes in revenue (UNCERT * Δln(Rev)). The coefficient on RankCC * Δln(Rev) is still 
negative and statistically significant in all four columns, providing evidence that our 
results are not being driven by omitting demand uncertainty in our main tests. These 
results also confirm the previously observed negative relationship between demand 
uncertainty and cost structure (UNCERT * Δln(Rev) < 0).  
 We also investigate potential multicollinearity in our analysis by calculating 
variable inflation factors (VIFs) for all regressions reported in Tables 4 through 9. Greene 
(2008) suggests a VIF cutoff value of 10 as indicating a high level of multicollinearity. In 
untabulated results, VIFs are below 10 for all variables except for Δln(Rev) in our 
reported results, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a significant problem for the 
majority of variables in our analysis.  The high VIF value for Δln(Rev) is expected given 
that it is used to form interaction terms in all of our models. Brambor, Clark, and Golder 
(2006) suggest that the potential for making inferential errors due to the exclusion of 
formative terms in models which include multiplicative interaction terms outweighs any 
potential benefits from excluding such terms. Consequently, we continue to include the 
term Δln(Rev) in our analysis.  
Finally, we re-estimate our regression models using two alternative methods of 
dealing with outlying observations to ensure that our results are robust. First, we 
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winsorize (rather than truncate) observations with values of Δln(Rev), Δln(OC), 
Δln(SGA), Δln(EMP), or Δln(COGS) in the highest and lowest 0.5% of the distribution. 
Second, we re-estimate our regression models without truncating or winsorizing outlying 
observations. Results using these methods of dealing with outlying observations yield the 
same inferences as the results reported in Tables 4 through 9. 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
We examine the effect of customer concentration on cost elasticity. Analyzing 
cost data for a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms from 1976-2013, we find a negative 
relationship between customer concentration and cost elasticity, with firms exhibiting 
lower proportions of variable-to-fixed costs in the presence of more concentrated 
customer bases. This negative relationship is strengthened by the presence of the high 
levels of customer bargaining power. Additional analysis shows that these results hold 
after controlling for the effects of supplier leverage and both asset and employee 
intensity. Our results are also robust to alternative specifications of customer 
concentration as well as the use of a two-stage model to control for endogeneity.   
This study contributes to the literature on cost structure by identifying customer 
concentration as an important environmental determinant of firm cost structure decisions. 
This finding is important given both the observed increases in customer concentration 
over the past few decades and the significant differences in customer concentration levels 
observed across industries (Cao, Hsieh, and Kohlbeck 2013). Our findings related to the 
impact of customer bargaining power shed light on the mechanisms through which 
customer concentration affects firm cost structure decisions. Overall, our findings suggest 
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that customer concentration may create financial risk for suppliers while also presenting 
opportunities for suppliers to build mutual dependence by cooperating with customers. 
Additionally, our results contribute to a broader understanding of the impact of customer 
concentration on suppliers by identifying cost structure as a potential explanation for 
previously observed increases in financial risk and cost of equity capital associated with 
higher levels of customer concentration. 
Our findings offer a number of directions for future research. For example, prior 
literature identifies trust, transparency, and information technology as factors which 
promote mutually beneficial supplier-customer relationships. Future studies may examine 
how these and other factors influence the relationship between customer concentration 
and cost structure. Furthermore, our findings suggest that suppliers’ relative bargaining 
power with their customers influences their cost structure decisions. Future research may 
also investigate how other types of stakeholders, such as employees or regulators, affect 
firms’ cost structure decisions. 
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Appendix B 
Variable Definitions 
 
Δln Log change operator 
REV Total revenues (in millions) 
OC Total operating costs [revenue minus operating income] (in millions) 
SGA Selling, general, and administrative costs (in millions) 
EMP Number of employees (in thousands) 
COGS Cost of goods sold (in millions) 
TA Total assets (in millions) 
PPE Gross property, plant, and equipment (in millions) 
DEBT Long term plus short term debt (in millions) 
CC 
Customer concentration score for firm i in year t (CCit) equals 
∑ (
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
)
2
𝐽
𝑗= where Salesijt represents firm i’s sales to customer j in year t and 
Salesit represents total sales for firm i in year t 
RankCC 
Decile rank of the customer concentration variable CC scaled to range from 0 to 
1. 
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index calculated using three digit SIC code 
Fluid 
Product market fluidity score for firm I in year t equals (𝑁𝑖,𝑡 ∙
𝐷𝑡−1,𝑡
‖𝐷𝑡−1,𝑡‖
) where Ni,t 
is a vector indicating which from among all unique product-related words are used 
by firm i during year t and Dt-1,t  is the aggregate change vector which captures 
overall changes in word usage between year t-1 and year t.  
HighPowerHHI 
High customer bargaining power indicator variable equals 1 if the firm's HHI is 
above the sample median, 0 otherwise. 
HighPowerFluid 
High customer bargaining power indicator variable equals 1 if the firm's product 
market fluidity is above the sample median, 0 otherwise. 
RankPowerHHI 
High customer bargaining power variable equal to the firm’s decile-ranked HHI 
value. 
RankPowerFluid 
High customer bargaining power indicator variable equal to the firm’s decile-
ranked product market fluidity score. 
DebtRatio Debt-to-equity ratio 
HighDebt 
High debt-to-equity indicator variable equals 1 if the firm’s DebtRatio is above 
the sample median, 0 otherwise. 
MajCust 
Major customer indicator variable equals 1 if the firm has at least one customer 
that accounts for 10% or more of its total sales, 0 otherwise.  
ASINT Asset intensity = 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑃𝑃𝐸
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
 
EMPINT Employee intensity = 
# 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
 
GDPGrowth log change in GDP 
Size Natural log of sales 
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Table 3.1 
Sample Composition by Industry 
 
2-Digit 
SIC 
Code 
Industry Name N 
% of 
Sample 
20 Food and Kindred Products 2,027 4.33% 
21 Tobacco Products 101 0.22% 
22 Textile Mill Products 755 1.61% 
23 
Apparel and Other Finished Products Made from Fabrics and 
Similar Materials 1,234 2.63% 
24 Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 404 0.86% 
25 Furniture and Fixtures 616 1.32% 
26 Paper and Allied Products 819 1.75% 
27 Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries 871 1.86% 
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 6,794 14.51% 
29 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 449 0.96% 
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 1,433 3.06% 
31 Leather and Leather Products 369 0.79% 
32 Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products 509 1.09% 
33 Primary Metal Industries 1,587 3.39% 
34 
Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery and 
Transportation Equipment 1,929 4.12% 
35 
Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer 
Equipment 7,075 15.11% 
36 
Electronic and Other Electrical Equipment and Components, 
Except Computer Equipment 9,600 20.50% 
37 Transportation Equipment 2,547 5.44% 
38 
Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling Instruments; 
Photographic, Medical, and Optical Goods; Watches and 
Clocks 6,573 14.03% 
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 1,144 2.44% 
    
Total  46,836 100.00% 
Table 1 presents the industry composition for the sample of firm-year observations used in this study. The sample 
consists of manufacturing firms (SIC 2000 - 3999) that report at least one strong customer in the Compustat 
Customer Segment database. Observations with values of REV, OC, SGA, EMP, or COGS in the highest and 
lowest .5% of the distribution are truncated. 
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Table 3.2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
    Percentiles 
Variable n Mean Std. Dev. 25th 50th 75th 
REV 46,836 753 3,785 11 51 254 
OC  46,836 675 3,432 13 50 233 
SGA  44,301 145 684 4 13 50 
EMP 45,309 6 22 0 1 3 
COGS 46,836 502 2,824 7 33 164 
TA 46,836 841 4,813 12 49 237 
PPE 46,759 475 3,155 4 18 104 
DEBT 46,836 223 1,796 1 5 52 
CC 46,836 0.1333 0.1812 0.0189 0.0622 0.1721 
HHI 46,836 0.1723 0.1535 0.0743 0.1209 0.2149 
Fluid 16,286 6.5024 3.5982 3.8739 5.7234 8.3263 
DebtRatio 46,835 0.6495 27.8205 0.0119 0.2683 0.7566 
ASINT 46,759 0.6758 2.8530 0.2268 0.3869 0.6450 
EMPINT 45,309 1.0730 6.8139 0.4121 0.6976 1.1795 
MajCust 46,836 0.7484 0.4339 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the sample used in the study. REV equals a firm’s total revenue in year 
t. OC equals  a firm’s total operating costs (in millions) in year t. SGA equals  a firm’s selling and general costs 
(in millions) in year t. EMP equals a firm’s number of employees (in thousands) in year t. COGS is a firm’s cost 
of goods sold (in millions) in year t. TA refers to a firms total assets (in millions) in year t. PPE equals a firm’s 
gross property plant and equipment (in millions) in year t. DEBT equals a firm’s short term plus long term debt 
(in millions) for year t. Variables measured in monetary units are CPI adjusted using 1982-84 as the base  year. 
CC is the measure of a firm’s customer concentration following Patatoukas (2012) for year t. HHI is a firm’s 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for year t based on the firm’s three digit SIC code. Fluidity is a firm’s product 
market fluidity score for year t. DebtRatio is a firm’s debt to equity ratio for year t. ASINT is a firm’s asset 
intensity for year t. EMPINT is a firm’s employee intensity for year t. MajCust equals 1 if a firm has at least one 
customer that accounts for 10% or more of its total sales, 0 otherwise. Detailed variable definitions are presented 
in Appendix A. 
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Table 3.4 
Main Results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Δln(OC) Δln(SGA) Δln(EMP) Δln(COGS) 
Δln(REV) 0.507*** 0.285*** 0.157*** 0.744*** 
 (17.88) (7.25) (4.09) (20.28) 
RankCC * Δln(REV) -0.138*** -0.209*** -0.133*** -0.092*** 
 (-9.43) (-11.55) (-7.08) (-4.03) 
GDPGrowth * Δln(REV) 1.136*** 1.807*** 1.332*** 0.348 
 (4.57) (5.99) (4.69) (0.86) 
Size * Δln(REV) 0.075*** 0.068*** 0.049*** 0.054*** 
 (32.91) (24.39) (18.66) (14.84) 
RankCC 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.018*** 0.007** 
 (5.40) (3.48) (4.84) (2.07) 
GDPGrowth 0.387*** 0.214*** 0.591*** 0.301*** 
 (9.68) (3.69) (9.60) (5.71) 
Size -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.000 -0.004*** 
 (-11.71) (-9.13) (-0.13) (-6.74) 
ΣIndustryFE included included included included 
ΣIndustryFE * Δln(REV) included included included included 
n 46,836 44,086 43,580 46,819 
Adj. R2 0.6929 0.3718 0.2761 0.6076 
Table 4 presents results from the following regression: 
Δln(Cost) = β0 +  β1Δln(Rev)  +  β2RankCC * Δln(Rev) +  β3GDPGrowth * Δln(Rev)  
     + β4Size * Δln(Rev)  +  β5RankCC +  β6GDPGrowth + β7Size  
     + Σγ1-19IndFE + Σψ1-19IndFE * Δln(Rev)  +  ε  
 
The term Δln represents the log change operator defined as the natural log of (Xit / Xit-1). We examine four types 
of costs: Operating costs (OC), selling, general, and administrative costs (SGA), number of employees (EMP), 
and cost of goods sold (COGS). REV equals a firm’s total revenue in year t. RankCC is the decile rank of the 
customer concentration measure (CC) scaled to range from 0 to 1 following Patatoukas (2012). GDPGrowth is 
the log change in GDP for year t. Size equals the natural log of a firm’s sales in year t. IndustryFE are industry 
fixed effects based on the firm’s two digit SIC code. T-statistics are presented in parentheses below the 
coefficients. Standard errors are clustered by firm (Peterson 2009). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. Detailed variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
119 
 
 
Table 3.5 
Cross-sectional Results for Customer Bargaining Power 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Δln(OC) Δln(OC) Δln(OC) Δln(OC) 
Δln(REV) 0.509*** 0.445*** 0.523*** 0.501*** 
 (18.52) (9.85) (18.54) (10.54) 
RankCC * Δln(REV) -0.092*** -0.092** -0.066** -0.063 
 (-4.64) (-2.44) (-2.55) (-1.38) 
HighPowerHHI * Δln(REV) -0.063***    
 (-3.88)    
HighPowerHHI * RankCC * Δln(REV) -0.058**    
 (-2.30)    
HighPowerFluid * Δln(REV)  -0.067**   
  (-2.30)   
HighPowerFluid * RankCC * Δln(REV)  -0.084*   
  (-1.92)   
RankPowerHHI * Δln(REV)   -0.140***  
   (-5.07)  
RankPowerHHI * RankCC * Δln(REV)   -0.093**  
   (-2.30)  
RankPowerFluid * Δln(REV)    -0.187*** 
    (-4.08) 
RankPowerFluid * RankCC * Δln(REV)    -0.115* 
    (-1.74) 
ΣIndustryFE included included included included 
ΣIndustryFE * Δln(REV) included included included included 
Controls and intercept terms included included included included 
N 46,836 16,286 46,836 16,286 
Adj. R2 0.6964 0.6851 0.6987 0.6895 
Table 5 presents results from cross-sectional tests of the effects of customer bargaining power on the relationship between 
customer concentration and cost structure. HighPowerHHI, our first measure of customer bargaining power, is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the firm's Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (based on three-digit SIC code) is below the sample median and 
0 otherwise. HighPowerFluid, our second measure of customer bargaining power, is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm's 
product market fluidity score is above the sample median and 0 otherwise. RankPowerHHI, our third measure of competition, 
is equal to the firm's decile-ranked Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (based on three-digit SIC code). RankPowerFluid, our fourth 
measure of competition, is equal to the firm's decile-ranked product market fluidity score. The symbol Δln represents the log 
change operator defined as the natural log of (Xit / Xit-1). We examine four types of costs: Operating costs (OC), selling, 
general, and administrative costs (SGA), number of employees (EMP), and cost of goods sold (COGS). For brevity, only 
estimates for operating costs are presented. REV equals a firm’s total revenue in year t. RankCC is the decile rank of the 
customer concentration measure (CC) scaled to range from 0 to 1 following Patatoukas (2012). GDPGrowth is the log change 
in GDP for year t. Size equals the natural log of a firm’s sales in year t. IndustryFE are industry fixed effects based on the 
firm’s two digit SIC code. T-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. Standard errors are clustered by 
firm (Peterson 2009). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. Detailed variable 
definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
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Table 3.6 
Robustness Tests: Controls for Debt 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Δln(OC) Δln(OC) Δln(OC) 
 (Full Sample) (Low Debt) (High Debt) 
Δln(REV) 0.498*** 0.519*** 0.488*** 
 (16.99) (14.47) (12.64) 
RankCC * Δln(REV) -0.136*** -0.122*** -0.153*** 
 (-9.29) (-6.28) (-7.11) 
HighDebt * Δln(REV) 0.015*   
 (1.75)   
GDPGrowth * Δln(REV) 1.139*** 0.939*** 1.376*** 
 (4.57) (2.77) (3.78) 
Size * Δln(REV) 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.076*** 
 (32.16) (25.28) (22.01) 
RankCC 0.013*** 0.009** 0.017*** 
 (5.34) (2.40) (5.58) 
HighDebt -0.013   
 (-0.51)   
GDPGrowth 0.387*** 0.566*** 0.203*** 
 (9.69) (8.68) (4.47) 
Size -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.006*** 
 (-11.49) (-4.88) (-12.31) 
ΣIndustryFE Included included included 
ΣIndustryFE * Δln(REV) Included included included 
N 46,836 23,242 23,594 
Adj. R2 0.6930 0.6501 0.7469 
Table 6 presents results from cross-sectional and partitioned robustness tests which control for the effects of firm 
debt. Equation (1) is a cross-sectional analysis which controls for firm debt using an indicator variable. Equations 
(2) and (3) partition the full sample into low and high debt firms. HighDebt is an indicator variable equal to 1 if 
the firm’s debt ratio is above the sample median and 0 otherwise. The symbol Δln represents the log change 
operator defined as the natural log of (Xit / Xit-1). We examine four types of costs: Operating costs (OC), selling, 
general, and administrative costs (SGA), number of employees (EMP), and cost of goods sold (COGS). REV 
equals a firm’s total revenue in year t. RankCC is the decile rank of the customer concentration measure (CC) 
scaled to range from 0 to 1 following Patatoukas (2012). GDPGrowth is the log change in GDP for year t. Size 
equals the natural log of a firm’s sales in year t. IndustryFE are industry fixed effects based on the firm’s two 
digit SIC code. T-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. Standard errors are clustered by 
firm (Peterson 2009). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Detailed variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
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Table 3.7 
Robustness Tests: Controls for Asset and Employee Intensity 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Δln(OC) Δln(SGA) Δln(EMP) Δln(COGS) 
Δln(REV) 0.507*** 0.285*** 0.157*** 0.744*** 
 (17.88) (7.25) (4.09) (20.28) 
RankCC * Δln(REV) -0.138*** -0.209*** -0.133*** -0.092*** 
 (-9.43) (-11.55) (-7.08) (-4.03) 
ASINT * Δln(REV) -0.005*** -0.012*** -0.006* -0.007*** 
 (-3.91) (-2.99) (-1.79) (-3.26) 
EMPINT * Δln(REV) 0.003*** 0.011*** 0.009*** -0.001 
 (2.92) (3.61) (3.31) (-0.29) 
GDPGrowth * Δln(REV) 1.136*** 1.807*** 1.332*** 0.348 
 (4.57) (5.99) (4.69) (0.86) 
Size * Δln(REV) 0.075*** 0.068*** 0.049*** 0.054*** 
 (32.91) (24.39) (18.66) (14.84) 
RankCC 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.018*** 0.007** 
 (5.40) (3.48) (4.84) (2.07) 
ASINT -0.002* -0.003 -0.006* -0.003*** 
 (-1.88) (-0.84) (-1.81) (-2.75) 
EMPINT 0.001* 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.001** 
 (1.73) (3.31) (4.17) (2.23) 
GDPGrowth 0.387*** 0.214*** 0.591*** 0.301*** 
 (9.68) (3.69) (9.60) (5.71) 
Size -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.000 -0.004*** 
 (-11.71) (-9.13) (-0.13) (-6.74) 
ΣIndustryFE included included included Included 
ΣIndustryFE * Δln(REV) included included included Included 
n 46,836 44,086 43,580 46,819 
Adj. R2 0.6929 0.3718 0.2761 0.6076 
Table 7 presents results from cross-sectional robustness tests which control for the effects of asset and employee intensity. ASINT, our measure 
of a firm’s asset intensity, equals a firm’s gross property, plant, and equipment divided by sales for year t. EMPINT, our measure of a firm’s 
employee intensity, equals a firm’s number of employees divided by sales for year t.  The symbol Δln represents the log change operator 
defined as the natural log of (Xit / Xit-1). We examine four types of costs: Operating costs (OC), selling, general, and administrative costs 
(SGA), number of employees (EMP), and cost of goods sold (COGS). REV equals a firm’s total revenue in year t. RankCC is the decile rank 
of the customer concentration measure (CC) scaled to range from 0 to 1 following Patatoukas (2012). GDPGrowth is the log change in GDP 
for year t. Size equals the natural log of a firm’s sales in year t. IndustryFE are industry fixed effects based on the firm’s two digit SIC code. 
T-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. Standard errors are clustered by firm (Peterson 2009). *, **,  and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. Detailed variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
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Table 3.8 
Results using 2SLS Estimation of Customer Concentration 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Full Sample Increasing CC Sample 
 Δln(OC) Δln(OC) 
Δln(REV) 0.464*** 0.593*** 
 (15.05) (10.77) 
RankCCResid * Δln(REV) 0.003 -0.174*** 
 (0.21) (-3.79) 
GDPGrowth * Δln(REV) 0.734*** 1.191*** 
 (2.93) (3.19) 
Size * Δln(REV) 0.074*** 0.071*** 
 (-23.91) (17.96) 
RankCCResid -0.019*** -0.001 
 (-6.84) (-0.20) 
GDPGrowth 0.209*** 0.188*** 
 (5.12) (3.39) 
Size -0.007*** -0.005*** 
 (-15.23) (-8.49) 
ΣIndustryFE included included 
ΣIndustryFE * Δln(REV) included included 
n 31,373 15,699 
Adj. R2 0.7311 0.7188 
Table 8 presents results from the following regression: 
Δln(OC) = β0 +  β1Δln(Rev)  +  β2RankCCResid * Δln(Rev) +  β3GDPGrowth * Δln(Rev)  
     + β4Size * Δln(Rev)  +  β5RankCCResid +  β6GDPGrowth + β7Size  
     + Σγ1-19IndFE + Σψ1-19IndFE * Δln(Rev)  +  ε  
 
The term Δln represents the log change operator defined as the natural log of (Xit / Xit-1). We us total 
operating costs (OC) as our dependent variable of interest. REV equals a firm’s total revenue in year 
t. RankCCResid is the residual from an OLS estimation of customer concentration scores based on 
market capitalization, firm age, sales growth, number of segments, and industry concentration. 
GDPGrowth is the log change in GDP for year t. Size equals the natural log of a firm’s sales in year 
t. IndustryFE are industry fixed effects based on the firm’s two digit SIC code. T-statistics are 
presented in parentheses below the coefficients. Standard errors are clustered by firm (Peterson 
2009). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. Detailed 
variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
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Table 3.9 
Robustness Tests: Subsample Analyses 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (3) 
 Δln(OC) Δln(OC) Δln(OC) Δln(OC) 
 (MajCust=1) 
(Identified 
Customers) 
(Sales > 
$10M) 
(After 1997) 
Δln(REV) 0.537*** 0.588*** 0.702*** 0.429*** 
 (16.00) (6.75) (19.41) (9.36) 
RankCC * Δln(REV) -0.169*** -0.226*** -0.131*** -0.115*** 
 (-9.57) (-4.10) (-7.98) (-5.33) 
GDPGrowth * Δln(REV) 1.176*** 1.868** 0.960*** 1.278*** 
 (4.31) (2.45) (3.76) (3.94) 
Size * Δln(REV) 0.075*** 0.067*** 0.042*** 0.074*** 
 (29.40) (9.19) (13.68) (23.02) 
RankCC 0.015*** 0.005 0.008*** 0.007** 
 (4.38) (0.49) (3.49) (2.01) 
GDPGrowth 0.481*** 0.448*** 0.095*** 0.541*** 
 (9.89) (3.71) (3.26) (8.83) 
Size -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.001 
 (-9.62) (-4.54) (-14.00) (-1.10) 
ΣIndustryFE included included included included 
ΣIndustryFE * Δln(REV) included included included included 
n 35,054 4,583 36,031 21,739 
Adj. R2 0.6718 0.7402 0.8301 0.6572 
Table 9 presents results for sub-sample analyses of our main results based on the following regression: 
Δln(Cost) = β0 +  β1Δln(Rev)  +  β2RankCC * Δln(Rev) +  β3GDPGrowth * Δln(Rev)  
     + β4Size * Δln(Rev)  +  β5RankCC +  β6GDPGrowth + β7Size  
     + Σγ1-19IndFE + Σψ1-19IndFE * Δln(Rev)  +  ε  
 
Equation (1) includes only firm-year observations which report at least one customer that accounts for 10% or 
more of its sales (MajCust = 1). Equation (2) includes only firm-year observations with major customers (MajCust 
= 1) that can be identified using the Compustat database. Equation (3) includes only firm-year observations for 
firms with greater than $10 million in sales revenue. Equation (4) includes only firm-year observations after 1997. 
The symbol Δln represents the log change operator defined as the natural log of (Xit / Xit-1). We examine four types 
of costs: Operating costs (OC), selling, general, and administrative costs (SGA), number of employees (EMP), and 
cost of goods sold (COGS). For brevity, only estimates for operating costs are presented. REV equals a firm’s total 
revenue in year t. RankCC is the decile rank of the customer concentration measure (CC) scaled to range from 0 
to 1 following Patatoukas (2012). GDPGrowth is the log change in GDP for year t. Size equals the natural log of 
a firm’s sales in year t. IndustryFE are industry fixed effects based on the firm’s two digit SIC code. T-statistics 
are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. Standard errors are clustered by firm (Peterson 2009). *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. Detailed variable definitions are 
presented in Appendix A. 
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